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Abstract
This dissertation examines the theories of collectivity or social grouphood
presupposed by accounts of collective intentionality, collective action and collective
moral responsibility. I consider the intentionalist theories of social grouphood proposed
by John Searle and Margaret Gilbert, Larry May's conceptual account of social
grouphood, and Paul Sheehy's realist conception of social grouphoood. All three
approaches are found to be problematic. The theories of Searle and Gilbert fail to
adequately explain the causal relationship between collectives and their members, the
heterogeneity of social groups and non-voluntary social groups; May's theory is
problematic insofar as it relies on sameness among individual group members; and, as a
consequence of his failure to recognize that the causal powers of a social group are
mediated by, and thereby depend upon, the perspectives of individuals, Sheehy's account
is unable to explain non-voluntary social groups. A conception of social grouphood that is
able to avoid these shortcomings is identified. However, it raises doubts about the
possibility of collective agency, something that theories of collective action and collective
moral responsibility tend to assume. Consequently, I explore whether collective action
and collective moral responsibility require collective agency. Theories of collective action
and collective moral responsibility that do not require collective agency have been
proposed. These proposals conceive of collective action and collective moral
responsibility as joint action and joint moral responsibility, respectively. I recommend a
dialogical account of joint action that is consistent with the notion that only individuals
can be agents and supports ascriptions of joint moral responsibility.
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Introduction
The ascription of moral responsibility to collective entities, such as business
corporations, nation-states, and government agencies, is a common occurrence. Tobacco
companies are sued for their failure to disclose the dangers associated with the use of
their products, manufacturing corporations are fined for releasing pollutants into the air
or water, and sanctions are imposed upon sovereign nations for their perceived failure to
protect the welfare of their citizens or for the threat that they pose to the citizens of other
nations. However, H.D. Lewis argues that ascriptions of moral responsibility to
collectives are merely "linguistic devices which make for succinctness of expression or
poetic and rhetorical effect."1 Only individuals are "capable of acting rightly or wrongly
in the sense in which such conduct is immediately morally good or morally bad."2
Collectives are merely "abstractions" and, therefore, incapable of moral agency.3
Similarly, Jan Narveson contends that only individuals can "literally be the bearer of full
responsibility."4 He maintains that all moral claims are necessarily claims about how
individuals ought to behave. Consequently, to be understandable, ascriptions of moral
responsibility to collectives must be rephrased as statements about individuals.5
D.E. Cooper accepts that on some occasions people make statements that seem to
ascribe moral responsibility to a collective when in fact they intend to refer to individual
members of the collective. He insists, however, that at least some ascriptions of moral
responsibility can be neither dismissed as error or rhetoric nor reduced to statements
1

H.D. Lewis "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy Vol. 23, No. 84 (January 1948): 7.
Ibid, 9.
3
Ibid, 13.
4
Jan Narveson, "Collective Responsibility," The Journal of Ethics Vol. 6, No. 2 (2002):
179.
5
Ibid, 180.
2

about the moral responsibility of individuals. Cooper claims that, "Very often the person
who ascribes Responsibility is not willing or able to mention, explicitly, individuals. Nor,
if he could, would his statements mentioning individuals be equivalent in meaning to his
statement about the collective."6 Whether or not an ascription of moral responsibility to a
collective is erroneous or rhetorical depends on the meaning that the speaker intends to
convey. The meaning of a statement that ascribes moral responsibility to a collective may
differ from the meaning of a statement or set of statements that ascribe moral
responsibility to individuals.7 To illustrate, Cooper invites the reader to consider an
example wherein a stew is described as delicious. The person who describes the stew as
delicious means to suggest that the combination of ingredients is delicious and not that
the individual ingredients are delicious. Some ascriptions of moral responsibility to
collectives are analogous insofar as they cannot be reduced to ascriptions of moral
responsibility to individuals.8 Cooper concludes, therefore, that moral responsibility can
be ascribed to both collectives and individuals.
Tracy Isaacs agrees. In "Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective
Intention," Isaacs argues that both individuals and collectives may be held morally
responsible for their actions. Collectives may be held morally responsible for their
actions because there are morally significant acts, such as genocide, that are "essentially
collective."9 She contends that acts like genocide are essentially collective because they
can be neither performed by an individual nor fully explained in terms of the acts of
6

D.E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy Vol. 43, No. 165 (July 1968):
259-60.
7
Ibid, 260.
8
Ibid, 262.
9
Tracy Isaacs, "Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention," Midwest
Studies in Philosophy Vol. 30 (2006): 63.
2

individuals. Individuals may participate in collective acts. However, collective action
consists in more than the contributions of individual participants. According to Isaacs,
"there is an overarching sense of purpose and joint effort that defines the action and gives
it its character as a collective action."10 Collective action consists in the interrelated
contributions of individual participants. Moreover, one must refer to a collective action to
assess the moral significance of the actions of individual participants. She insists, for
example, that the moral significance of an act of murder differs from that of an act of
murder as a contribution to genocide. There are instances when "the moral significance of
individuals' acts is apparent only when considered together with the acts of others."11
Thus, to assess the moral significance of collective action and the contributions of
individuals to collective action, one must recognize both individual and collective moral
responsibility. Like individuals, collectives may be considered moral agents.
According to Isaacs, to be a moral agent is to possess the capacity to perform
intentional actions.12 Hence, collective moral responsibility presupposes the possibility of
collective intentionality. As she states, "Just as individual agents must have the capacity
to act on the basis of intentions individually to count as moral agents, collective agents
must have the capacity to act on the basis of intentions as collectives to count as moral
agents."13
As with theories of collective responsibility, there are reductionist and nonreductionist theories of collective intentionality. Reductionist theories of collective
intentionality suggest that collective intentionality is reducible to the individual intentions
10

Ibid, 64.
Ibid, 65.
12
Ibid, 59.
13
Ibid, 63.
11
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of all, or at least most, of the members of a group. For example, Anthony Quinton argues
that when one ascribes mental states, such as intentionality, to a group one is speaking
metaphorically. The relationship between a group and its members is one of "a whole to
its parts."14 When one ascribes a mental state to the whole one is in fact suggesting that
the mental state in question exists in the minds of all or most of the parts that constitute
the whole. As Quinton states, "To ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an
indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its members.. .To say that the industrial
working class is determined to resist anti-trade-union laws is to say that all or most
industrial workers are so minded."15 Thus, according to Quinton, when one ascribes
intentionality to a group one is in fact claiming that all or most of the individual members
of the group share the same individual intention.
Isaacs argues that a reductionist understanding of collective intentionality cannot
support her conception of collective moral responsibility for "simply aggregating
individual intentions, even individual intentions that specify collective goals, is not
sufficient for collective intention or for collective action."16 Instead, the theory of
collective moral responsibility that she endorses requires a non-reductionist
understanding of collective intentionality that recognizes that certain relations must
obtain among the intentions of individuals to achieve collective action. Isaacs believes
that Michael Bratman's account of shared intentions satisfies this requirement.

Anthony Quinton, "Social Objects," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 76
(1976): 11.
15
Ibid, 17
16
Isaacs, 66.
4

Michael Bratman contends that a shared intention consists in the interrelated
intentions and beliefs of individuals.17 When a collective shares an intention, each
member of the collective has the intention that the group jointly engage in the
performance of a particular activity.18 A group can only jointly engage in the
performance of a particular activity if the means by which each participant intends that
the group perform the activity are consistent, that is, if the subplans of the participants do
not conflict. Therefore, it must be by means of consistent subplans that each member of
the group intends that the group perform the joint activity.19 Moreover, the members of
the group must be aware of one another's intentions.20 Hence, according to Bratman:
We intend to J if and only if
1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J.
2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing
subplans of la and lb; you intend that we J in accordance with and
because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb.
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us.21
Whereas an individual intention is a state of mind, Bratman suggests that a
collective or shared intention is a state of affairs that consists in individual intentions and
the relations in which they stand.22 Issacs maintains that the relations that exist among
individual intentions are what account for the irreducibility of collective intentionality
and are, thereby, what support her claim that collective action is irreducible.23 Collective
moral responsibility cannot be fully explained in terms of individual moral responsibility
Michael Bratman, Faces of Intention (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 111.
18
Ibid, 115.
19
Ibid, 120-1.
20
Ibid, 117.
21
Ibid, 121.
22
Michael Bratman, "Shared Intention," Ethics 104 (October 1993): 107-8.
23
Isaacs, 68.
5

because the actions for which collectives may be held morally responsible cannot be fully
explained in terms of the actions of individuals. Collective action cannot be fully
explained in terms of individual action because collective action is the product of
collective intentionality, and collective intentionality cannot be fully explained in terms
of individual intentionality because collective intentionality consists in individual
intentions and the relations that exist among them.
Theorists who endorse a non-reductionist approach to collective intentionality
tend to agree with Bratman and Isaacs that a satisfactory conception of collective
intentionality must take into account the relations that exist among individual intentions,
for these relations are what explain the social unity implied by the notion of collective
intentionality. There is disagreement, however, about the nature of the relations that
explain the irreducibility of collective intentionality. Anthonie Meijers and Margaret
Gilbert suggest, for example, that while the relations identified by Bratman may be
necessary to achieve collective intentionality, they are not sufficient. They argue that
collective intentionality entails a level of normativity that Bratman's account fails to
capture. According to Meijers, to share an intention is to participate in an agreement that
has normative implications. Meijers contends that, "Such agreements bind the
participants in various ways and are an explanatory factor in the subsequent collective
actions."24 Similarly, Gilbert claims that a collection of individuals can share an intention
if and only if they are jointly committed to the intention. Individuals are jointly
committed to an intention if and only if they indicate and recognize one another's
willingness to share responsibility for the intention. Once one's willingness to share
24

Anthonie W.M. Meijers, "Can Collective Intentionality Be Individualized?" American
Journal of Economics and Sociology Vol. 62, No. 1 (January 2003): 177.
6

responsibility has been indicated and recognized, one is a participant in a joint
commitment, and that joint commitment entails certain rights and responsibilities.25 Each
individual who participates in a joint commitment has an obligation to, and a
corresponding right to expect, the other participants to behave in a manner that is
consistent with the commitment.
There is also disagreement among scholars who accept the possibility of
collective responsibility about whether or not it requires collective intentionality. For
example, Paul Sheehy argues that, while it may be possible for members of small, simple
groups to share intentions, shared intentions are unlikely to obtain among members of
large, complex groups.27 Nevertheless, he maintains that collective responsibility may be
ascribed to a group whose members do not share an intention if the group "possesses a
capacity for deliberation and reflection and to make the morally appropriate response in
relation to its deeds and the judgments it faces."28 Sheehy notes that ascriptions of
individual responsibility tend to assume that the individual in question is "capable of (a)
forming and acting on intentions; (b) reflecting on goals, values, and actions and adjusting
them in light of the reflective process and new information; and, perhaps, (c)...capable of
the appropriate emotional response to her actions - in particular to experience shame,

25

Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2000), 15-22.
26
Ibid, 7-8.
27
Paul Sheehy, "Holding Them Responsible," Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 30
(2006): 75-6. Sheehy does not argue that it is impossible for members of large, complex
groups to share intentions. Rather, he maintains that it is unlikely.
28
Ibid, 78-9.
7

guilt, and remorse." For a collective to possess the capacity for deliberation and
reflection, the relations that obtain among its members and enable it to have a causal
impact on the world must include "practices that allow its members to reflect and
deliberate upon the group's character, goals, and practices, and to bring about changes in
those goals and ways of being."30 The practices and values of a collective emerge from the
ways in which individual members interact with one another, that is, they are "produced
collectively."31 Thus, a collective that is capable of reflection and deliberation may be held
morally responsible for its practices and values, and it is appropriate for individual
members to share feelings of shame, guilt or remorse about the morally suspect practices
or values of the collective.
In the chapters that follow, I will examine the conceptions of collectivity or social
grouphood upon which accounts of collective intentionality, collective action and
collective moral responsibility tend to be predicated, note their shortcomings and identify
an alternative theory of social grouphood that is able to avoid them. Specifically, I will
recommend a conception of social grouphood that, unlike the other theories considered, is
able to 1) account for the fact that, as social beings, our perceptions are shaped by the
unique positions that we occupy within complex webs of social relations, and 2) support
the idea that it is appropriate to ascribe intentionality, action and responsibility to
collectives.

*

29

Ibid, 76-7.
Ibid, 83.
31
Ibid, 86.
30
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The intentionalist theories of social grouphood proposed by John Searle and
Margaret Gilbert will be discussed in Chapter One. Searle defines a social group as a
collection of individuals who share a we-intention, and Gilbert argues that a social group
consists in a collection of individuals who are jointly committed to the same intention.32 I
will demonstrate that, in addition to these differences, there are also significant similarities
between the theories of Searle and Gilbert. Most importantly, they share a commitment
to ontological individualism. I will argue that as a consequence of this shared commitment,
the theories of Searle and Gilbert face similar challenges. Specifically, they are unable to
adequately account for the causal relationship between collectives and their members, the
heterogeneity of social groups and non-voluntary social groups.
In Chapter Two I will argue that Larry May's conceptual account of social
grouphood enjoys greater success than the theories of Searle and Gilbert. May claims that
a social group is nothing more than a concept that refers to interrelated individuals.
However, like the conceptions of social grouphood developed by Searle and Gilbert,
May's theory is problematic insofar as it relies on sameness among individual group
members. I will contend that a dialogical understanding of collective identity suggests
ways in which May's account may be modified to avoid this problem. Still, as I will
demonstrate, these modifications are not sufficient to resolve his theory's inability to
adequately account for collective action.

John Searle, "Responses to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality," Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 57, no.2 (June 1997): 450; Margaret Gilbert, On Social
Facts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 205.
9

Given the difficulties encountered by May's account of social groups, Paul
Sheehy's realist conception of social grouphood will be examined in Chapter Three.
According to Sheehy, a social group consists in a collection of individuals whose
mutually-affecting beliefs, attitudes, or activities give rise to unique causal properties and
powers.33 He maintains that social groups are material objects that both depend upon and
influence the relations in which individuals stand.34 Although Sheehy's theory is able to
avoid many of the problems from which the accounts of Searle, Gilbert and May suffer, I
will contend that, as a consequence of his failure to recognize that the causal powers of a
social group are mediated by, and thereby depend upon, the perspectives of individuals,
his account is unable to explain non-voluntary social groups. A similar conception of
social grouphood that does not face this problem will be considered. However, I will
demonstrate that when the influence of individuals on the causal powers of social groups
is taken into account, it raises doubts about the possibility of collective agency.
Given the questions raised in Chapters Two and Three about the possibility of
collective agency, in Chapter Four I will explore whether collective action and collective
moral responsibility require collective agency. Although accounts of collective action and
collective moral responsibility tend to assume that collective agency is possible, theories
that do not require collective agency have been proposed. These proposals conceive of
collective action and collective moral responsibility as joint action and joint moral
responsibility, respectively. Based on a review of these theories and my findings in the

33

Paul Sheehy, The Reality of Social Groups (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2006), 80.
34
Ibid, 99-100.
10

previous chapters, I will recommend a dialogical account of joint action that is consistent
with the notion that only individuals can be agents and supports ascriptions of joint
moral responsibility.
I will conclude that theories of collective intentionality, collective action and
collective moral responsibility tend to be predicated on problematic conceptions of social
grouphood. Some of the disagreements that exist among these theories may be resolved by
taking these problems into account. Although doing so may cast doubt on the possibility
of collective agency, this need not undermine the possibility of collective intentionality,
collective action and collective moral responsibility. Instead, these ideas may be
reconceived as joint intentionality, joint action and joint moral responsibility.
The theories of joint intentionality, joint action and joint morality responsibility
that I endorse are able to capture the sense of collectivity that ascriptions of collective
intentionality, collective action and collective moral responsibility entail. The conception
of joint action that I recommend states that a joint action is a state of affairs to which
individual group members have contributed and that is motivated by a joint intention. A
joint intention obtains when the individual actions of group members are motivated by an
intention to achieve a certain objective as a group that has been developed and endorsed
by the group through dialogue. This dialogical understanding of joint action accounts for
the sense of joint purpose and joint effort that ascriptions of collective action imply.
Moreover, I suggest that, in the case of joint action, it is appropriate to hold individuals
responsible for their contributory actions and the collective jointly responsible for the
state of affairs that ensues as a result of their contributory actions. Thus, the theory of
joint moral responsibility that I propose is able to acknowledge both individual and
11

collective responsibility. I believe that this theory of joint moral responsibility provides
greater support to ascriptions of moral responsibility to corporations, nation-states,
government agencies, and other collective entities, than the other accounts of collective
responsibility that I consider because, unlike the other accounts, it is founded on a
conceptions of social grouphood, joint intentionality and joint action that are consistent
with our understanding of human beings as inherently social.

12

Chapter One: Individualism, Intentionality, and Social Grouphood
I - Introduction
Like Tracy Isaacs, John Searle and Margaret Gilbert argue that there are acts,
such as playing football, performing a symphony or going for a walk together, that are
essentially collective insofar as they can be neither performed by an individual nor fully
explained in terms of the acts of individuals. Moreover, Searle and Gilbert agree with
Isaacs that such acts are irreducible because they are products of collective intentionality
and collective intentionality cannot be fully explained in terms of individual
intentionality. However, Searle and Gilbert disagree about why collective intentionality is
irreducible. For Searle collective intentionality cannot be fully explained in terms of
individual intentionality because collective intentionality is a kind of mental state, a weintention, that, like an individual intention, is formulated in the minds of individuals.
Gilbert, on the other hand, associates collective intentionality with a shared intention to
do something as a group. Individuals share an intention if and only if they indicate and
recognize one another's willingness to be jointly committed to the intention. Thus,
whereas Searle maintains that collective intentionality exists in the minds of individuals,
like Isaacs and Bratman, Gilbert contends that collective intentionality is a state of
affairs, a state of affairs that arises when individuals are jointly committed to an action,
objective or attitude.
Although Searle and Gilbert disagree about what collective intentionality is, they
agree that it is a condition of social grouphood. For both Searle and Gilbert a social group
consists in a collection of individuals who share a we-intention. Searle maintains that a
collection of individuals constitutes a social group if they possess the same we-intention.

13

Gilbert, on the other hand, contends that a collection of individuals constitutes a social
group if they are jointly committed to the same we-intention.35
I will demonstrate that, despite their differences, the theories of social grouphood
proposed by Searle and Gilbert are vulnerable to the same criticisms. Specifically: 1)
Searle and Gilbert are unable to adequately explain the causal relationship between a
social group and its individual members; 2) they suggest that sameness is a condition of
social grouphood and are consequently unable to account for the heterogeneity of social
groups; and 3) they are unable to account for non-voluntary social groups. I will argue
that what makes the theories of social grouphood proposed by Searle and Gilbert
vulnerable to these charges is their common commitment to ontological individualism.
Ontological individualism suggests that individuals are primary insofar as social groups
depend upon their individual members but individual members do not depend upon the
social groups to which they belong. I believe that the objections to the theories of Searle
and Gilbert are motivated by rejection of this principle.

II - Searle's Theory of Collective Intentionality
Searle defines collective intentionality as the belief, desire or intention to achieve
some goal or engage in some sort of behaviour as a group, and insists that a group of
individuals thinking "I intend" and acknowledging one another's individual intentionality
does not suffice to constitute collective intentionality. According to Searle, I-intentions
do not capture the sense of cooperation that differentiates we-intentions. As he states,
35

For Searle and Gilbert the kinds of intentional states upon which social grouphood may
be founded include beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, and objectives. See John Searle, The
Construction of Social Reality (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1995), 23; and Margaret
Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 12.
14

"The notion of a we-intention, of collective intentionality, implies the notion of
cooperation. But the mere presence of I-intentions to achieve a goal that happens to be
believed to be the same goal as that of other members of a group does not entail the
presence of an intention to cooperate to achieve that goal."36
Searle associates reductionist accounts of collective intentionality with the idea
that "because all intentionality exists in the heads of individual human beings, the form of
that intentionality can make reference only to the individuals in whose heads it exists."
He maintains that the inability of reductionist theories to successfully explain collective
intentionality suggests that the notion that intentions can only refer to individuals is
mistaken. Instead, Searle argues that human beings have an innate capacity to formulate
both I-intentions and we-intentions. Like I-intentions, we-intentions exist in the minds of
individuals. What distinguishes I-intentions from we-intentions are the agents to which
they refer. I-intentions refer only to the individuals who formulate them and weintentions refer to social groups to which the individuals who formulate the intentions
belong.38
Moreover, according to Searle, we-intentions gives rise to I-intentions. The Iintention of each individual to do his or her part in the performance of a group action is
determined by the we-intention to perform the action as a group. To illustrate, he
describes a situation in which two individuals must perform different tasks
simultaneously (one stirring and the other pouring) to make a hollandaise sauce. It is the

36

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 23; John Searle, "Collective Intentions and
Actions," in Intentions in Communication, eds. Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and
Martha E. Pollack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 406. Emphasis in original.
37
Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 25.
38
Ibid, 25-6.
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intention of the group to make the sauce by means of one person stirring and the other
person pouring. The fact that each member of the group has the intention to work
cooperatively to make the sauce causes each individual to engage in behaviour that will
most likely achieve the collective goal.39 We-intentions produce I-intentions which serve
as a means to achieving the collective goal.
Searle introduces his notion of collective intentionality in an effort to develop an
explanation of social facts that is consistent with the idea that the world consists of
nothing other than "physical particles in fields of force."40 Searle suggests that social
facts, which are objects or states of affairs that depend on human minds for their
existence, are ultimately derived from brute facts, which are objects or states of affairs
that exist independently of human minds. Brute facts are "those features of the world that
are matters of brute physics and biology."41 The fact that water freezes at zero degrees
Celsius is a brute fact, whereas the fact that Stephen Harper is prime minister of Canada
is a social fact.
According to Searle, the construction of social facts involves the collective
imposition of functions upon brute facts. He argues that functions are not intrinsic
features of brute facts, but rather are assigned by human beings either to describe natural
processes or to serve our practical interests. Searle refers to the former type of functions
as non-agentive and to the latter, intentional functions as agentive. The kind of function
assignment that is relevant to Searle's account of social facts involves the application of
agentive functions that allow brute facts to represent things other than themselves. For

Searle, "Collective Intentions and Actions," 410-2.
Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 1.
41
Ibid, 27.
40
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example, marks and sounds are brute facts. It is a social fact, however, that certain marks
and sounds constitute language. Language is created when the function of symbolizing
other entities is collectively imposed upon certain marks and sounds. Thus, language is a
social fact.42 The imposition of functions upon brute facts to construct social facts
depends on our innate capacity for collective intentionality.43 To create social facts
members of society must intend, as a group, to impose agentive functions upon brute
facts.

Ill - Searle's Theory of Social Grouphood
Searle's theory of social facts has been the subject of a great deal of analysis.44
Yet, there is a feature of his account that has received little attention, specifically, his
conception of social grouphood. Searle recognizes that, since we-intentions exist in the
minds of individuals, it is possible for an individual to be mistaken about his or her
circumstances such that his or her we-intention does not correspond to anything in the
real world. As he states, "I could have all the intentionality I do have even if I am
radically mistaken, even if the apparent presence and cooperation of other people is an
illusion, even if I am suffering a total hallucination, even if I am a brain in a vat."45 Thus,

42

Ibid, 14-15, 20-21.
Ibid, 23.
44
See, for example, Michael Corsten, "Between Constructivism and Realism - Searle's
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collective intentionality is necessary, but not sufficient, for collective action, such as the
creation of social facts. To perform a collective act, it must be the case that individuals
share a we-intention, and, according to Searle, when individuals share a we-intention,
they constitute a social group. He claims that, 'The existence of collective intentionality
does not imply the existence of human collectives actually satisfying the content of that
intentionality. But once you have collective intentionality then, if it is in fact shared by
other people, the result is more than just yourself and other people: collectively you now
form a social group."46 Hence, collective intentionality is a condition of social
grouphood, and social grouphood is a condition of collective action.
Searle insists that his account of social grouphood is consistent with
methododological individualism, that is, with the notion that all social phenomena can be
fully explained in terms of the actions and mental states of individuals. He claims that
the existence of collective intentionality as a psychological primitive in the
individual heads of individual agents does not commit one to a primitive ontology
of actual human collectives. On the contrary, the basic ontology is that of
individual human organisms and their mental states. The collective arises from
the fact that collective intentionality is in the individual heads of individual
organisms. The actual social collective consists of entirely individual agents with
collective intentionality in their heads, nothing more... [S]ocial collectives can be
constituted by the fact that individual agents think of themselves as part of a
collective without thereby supposing that the collective is an ontological
primitive. The collective's existence consists entirely in the fact that there is a
number of individual agents who think of themselves as part of the collective.47
Searle suggests that social groups can be fully explained in terms of the actions and
mental states of individuals because social groups consist in nothing more than
individuals and their mental states. That is, unlike collective intentionality, social
grouphood is reducible.
Searle, "Responses to Critics," 450. Emphasis in original.
Ibid, 449-50.
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Yet, since Searle maintains that collective intentionality is a condition of social
grouphood, at first glance, there appears to be a discrepancy between Searle's claim that
collective intentionality is irreducible insofar as it cannot be fully explained in terms of
individual intentionality and his claim that social grouphood is reducible insofar as it can
be fully explained in terms of the actions and mental states of individuals. However,
whereas Isaacs and Bratman argue that collective intentionality is irreducible because it
consists in individual intentions and the relations that exist among them, Searle maintains
that collective intentionality is irreducible because it is a kind of mental state that exists
in the minds of individuals. Since collective intentionality is a kind of mental state and a
social group consists in a collection of individuals who share this kind of mental state,
social groups can be fully explained in terms of individuals and their mental states.
Likewise, since collective action consists in members of a social group acting so as to
actualize the we-intentions that they share, collective action can be fully explained in
terms of the actions and mental states of individuals. Thus, while Searle may endorse a
non-reductionist approach to collective intentionality, he proposes reductionist
conceptions of social grouphood and collective action.

IV - Challenges to Searle's Theory of Social Grouphood
Methodological Individualism
Methodological individualism has been the subject of long and ongoing debate,
particularly among philosophers of social science. Like Searle, proponents of
methodological individualism contend that social phenomena emerge from the actions
and mental states of individuals, and therefore, it must be possible to fully explain social
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phenomena in terms of the actions and mental states of individuals. As J.W.N. Watkins
states, "the ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people who act more
or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions and understanding of their situation.
Every complex social situation, institution, or event is the result of a particular
configuration of individuals, their dispositions, situations, beliefs, and physical resources
and environment.
Scholars who reject methodological individualism acknowledge that social
phenomena depend upon the actions and mental states of individuals for their existence.
They deny, however, that from this fact it follows that social phenomena can be fully
explained in terms of the actions and mental states of individuals. For example, Maurice
Mandelbaum and Harold Kincaid argue that methodological individualism assumes that
social phenomena not only depend upon, but are also identical with, facts about
individuals.50 Kincaid maintains that this assumption is undermined by the fact that it is
possible for the same social fact to be realized in multiple ways. For example, the term
'peer group' may apply to many very different configurations of individuals.51 Likewise,
one set of individuals may be related biologically while another may have no biological
ties and yet it may be the case that they both constitute families. Moreover, the same facts
about individuals may yield different social facts. To illustrate, Kincaid uses the example
48
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of a worker who shoots his foreman. Multiple social descriptions are applicable to the
worker's conduct. He could be involved in an act of terrorism, religious conflict, class
conflict, domestic violence, etc. Methodological individualism implies that social facts
and the individual facts upon which they depend have the same extension. Hence, the
possibility of multiple descriptions is problematic for methodological individualism.52
Mandelbaum and Kincaid also maintain that methodological individualism
mistakenly assumes that social phenomena can be fully explained in terms of facts about
individuals. They argue that descriptions of individual facts tend to presuppose social
facts such that "those concepts which are used to refer to the forms of organization of a
society cannot be reduced without remainder to concepts which only refer to the thoughts
and actions of specific individuals."53 Kincaid attributes this to the fact that "many social
role predicates.. .have an essential social content."54 For example, the fact that the shooter
is a worker and his victim a foreman is relevant to an explanation of the event. Yet, the
predicates 'worker' and 'foreman' imply other social facts such as corporations and
social classes. Thus, Kincaid doubts that social facts can be completely eliminated from
satisfactory explanations of individual facts.
Although Searle's conceptions of social grouphood and collective action are
consistent with methodological individualism, he may be able to avoid the problems of
multiple realizability and multiple descriptions by appealing to the distinction between
type identity and token identity. According to type identity theory, social properties, such
as social grouphood, are identical to, and therefore may be fully explained in terms of, the
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properties of individuals. Token identity theory, on the other hand, suggests that instances
of social properties, such as a particular social group, are identical to, and therefore may
be fully explained in terms of, instances of individual properties.55 Multiple realizability
is problematic for type identity theory because type identity theory requires that all
instances to which a social property, such as social grouphood, may be ascribed be
reducible to the same individual properties. It is not problematic for token identity
theory, however, because token identity theory only requires that a particular instance of
a social property, such as a particular social group, be reducible to a particular set of
individual properties. Different instances of a social property may be reducible to
different sets of individual properties.
Similarly, the possibility of multiple descriptions is only problematic for type
identity theory. According to type identity theory, if a worker shooting his foreman may
be described as both an act of terrorism and an instance of class conflict, then the terms
'terrorism' and 'class conflict' must on all occasions have the same extension, namely
workers shooting their foremen. However, according to token identity theory, 'terrorism'
and 'class conflict' need only have the same extension for a particular instance of a
worker shooting his foreman. 'Terrorism' and 'class conflict' need not have the same
extension on all occasions and need not refer to workers shooting their foremen. Thus,
token identity theory is compatible with the notion that multiple social properties may be
ascribed to a single set of individual properties. Multiple social properties may be fully
explained in terms of the same set of individual properties on a particular occasion.
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The notion that individual facts tend to presuppose social facts poses a greater
challenge for Searle. Searle contends that a shared we-intention is a condition of social
grouphood. According to Jennifer Hornsby, a we-intention presupposes the existence of
the 'we' to which the intention refers. She asks, "Must not collectives come before all
mental states, in order that they can be represented by individual brains, giving rise to
'we'-intentions?"56 Searle denies that the collective to which a we-intention refers must
exist prior to development of the we-intention. Instead, he argues that "Collective
intentionality presupposes a Background sense of the other as a candidate for cooperative
agency; that is, it presupposes a sense of others as more than mere conscious agents,
indeed as actual or potential members of a cooperative activity."57 Before a collection of
individuals can share a we-intention, and thereby constitute a group, they must first share
an understanding of themselves and one another as potential group members. Since
collective intentionality implies cooperation, individuals must recognize themselves and
one another as agents capable of engaging in cooperative behaviour. To share an
understanding of oneself and others as cooperative agents is, Searle contends, to share a
"sense of us."5* He asserts that, "all genuine social groups" consist in "people who feel
themselves bound together by the concept of 'we' or 'us'." 59
According to Searle, this capacity to recognize others as cooperative agents is,
like the capacity to formulate we-intentions, something with which we are born.60 It is a
fact about individuals rather than a social fact, and therefore, social grouphood and
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collective action can be fully explained without reference to social facts. Yet, even if one
accepts the idea that such we-thoughts are innate, there are many different kinds of 'we's
and presumably each one has its own membership conditions. What is required to be a
member of a nation-state is very different from what is required to be a member of a
baseball team. We do not recognize ourselves and others as members, or potential
members, of just any 'we'. Rather, we recognize ourselves and others as members of a
particular kind of'we'. Thus, the 'we' of one's we-intention must be quite specific.
Where did that specific 'we' idea come from? Are we born with a variety of we-concepts
to cover all possibilities? Searle seems to be proposing a type identity understanding of
pre-intentional we-thoughts wherein 'we' has the same extension in all instances.
However, this makes his account vulnerable to the problems of multiple realizability and
multiple descriptions. To avoid these problems Searle may have to commit to token
identity theory and accept that the extension of 'we' may be different in different
instances. However, if he does so, then it appears that he will have to abandon the notion
that social grouphood and collective action can be fully explained without reference to
social facts.

Sameness
Searle's commitment to methodological individualism is not the only potential
source of difficulty for his conception of social grouphood. His account seems to require
that every member of a social group not only have in common a perception of themselves
as group members, but also share the same understanding of what membership in that
particular group requires. Consider the following example of two individuals, Jack and
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Sue, going for a walk together. If Jack and Sue share the we-intention to go for a walk
together, then, according to Searle, Jack and Sue constitute a social group. If, however,
Jack's understanding of going for a walk together involves Jack walking two feet ahead
of Sue at all times and Sue's understanding of going for a walk together involves Jack
and Sue walking alongside one another, then they do not share the same we-intention,
and therefore, do not constitute a social group. Although Jack and Sue may recognize one
another as potential cooperative agents and each of them possesses a we-intention to go
for a walk together, they do not constitute a social group because they possess different
understandings of what the we-intention entails. For Searle, to constitute a social group
individuals must be the same insofar as they possess the same perception of one another
as potential cooperative agents, the same we-intention and the same understanding of
what group membership entails. However, these conditions may make his account of
social grouphood vulnerable to charges of essentialism.
Accounts of gender and cultural identity that define social groups in terms of
sameness have been accused of ignoring significant differences among group members.
For example, Chandra Talpade Mohanty finds fault with some feminist scholars who, in
an attempt to achieve a global feminist solidarity, have constructed cross-cultural gender
categories on the basis of shared experience. These scholars emphasize the universality of
women's oppression as a foundation for a homogeneous feminist identity. Thus, to be a
feminist is to have the experiences that are associated with being a woman. In other
words, one's feminist identity is a consequence of the "gender" of one's experiences.
Mohanty refers to this type of account of feminist identity as the feminist osmosis thesis:
"Females are feminists by association and identification with the experiences which
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constitute us as female."61 She argues that efforts to construct a unified identity among
feminists based on shared experience are problematic because they do not account for
power differences. As she states, "Universal sisterhood...ends up being a middle-class,
psychologized notion which effectively erases material and ideological power differences
within and among groups of women."62
Similarly, Elizabeth Spelman contends that attempts to establish a unified
women's identity on the basis of shared experience tend to assume that racial, class,
cultural, power and other differences can be isolated from, and therefore do not influence,
gender identity. Consequently, differences among women's experience of oppression are
ignored.63 If sexism is the only kind of oppression that white, middle-class women
experience, and if all women's experience of oppression is the same, then the oppression
that white, middle-class women experience must be common to all women. That is, the
oppression that white, middle-class women experience is the same as the oppression that
non-white, non-middle-class women experience.64 However, Spelman maintains that,
"even if we say all women are oppressed by sexism we cannot automatically conclude
that the sexism all women experience is the same."65 She continues, "the fact that a
woman is not oppressed on account of her racial identity hardly leads to the conclusion
that the sexist oppression to which she is subject can be understood without reference to
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her racial identity."66 Accounts of women's identity that are based on shared experience
suggest that one's gender identity can be isolated from one's other identities, and this is
something that Spelman denies. She argues that, "Selves are not made up of separable
units of identity strung together to constitute a whole person."67
Uma Narayan contends that, like gender essentialist claims, cultural essentialist
claims ignore differences among members of cultural groups. She claims that, "They
depict as homogeneous groups of heterogeneous people whose values, interests, ways of
life, and moral and political commitments are internally plural and divergent."68 Narayan
maintains that the beliefs and practices in terms of which cultural groups are defined and
individuated are shaped by political interests and change over time.69 Thus, cultures are
not homogeneous and determinate, but are instead heterogeneous and variable.70
Likewise, Seyla Benhabib describes cultural groups as "polyvocal, multilayered,
decentered, and fractured systems of action and signification."71 They are "complex
human practices of signification and representation, of organization and attribution,
which are internally riven by conflicting narratives."72 Benhabib suggests that cultural
groups are heterogeneous because the actions and experiences that define social groups
must be interpreted to be intelligible and there are multiple, perhaps conflicting,
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meanings that may be ascribed to them. Consequently, she concludes that
"interpretations of cultures as hermetic, sealed, internally self-consistent wholes is
untenable."74

Voluntariness
Searle's commitment to the notion that group members must share an
understanding of themselves as such to constitute a social group may also prove
problematic for his theory of social grouphood insofar as it makes his theory unable to
account for non-voluntary social groups. Carolin Emcke claims that social groups may be
voluntary and/or non-voluntary. A social group is voluntary if its members share beliefs
and corresponding practices, chose to become members of the group, and are able to
leave the group if they wish to do so. On the other hand, a social group is non-voluntary
if its members did not choose to become members of the group, and are unable to leave
the group if they wish to do so. It is the shared beliefs and corresponding practices of
non-members that determine the membership of non-voluntary groups. What members of
non-voluntary groups share is the experience of having an identity, and having the social
rules, expectations, and practices associated with that identity, imposed upon them.75
Thus, whereas Searle claims that individuals must share an understanding of themselves
as at least potential group members to share a we-intention and thereby constitute a social
group, Emcke suggests that one can be a member of a non-voluntary social group without
73
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recognizing oneself as such. Membership in a non-voluntary social group merely requires
that one's membership be recognized by others.76
It appears that Searle's claim that collective intentionality is an innate mental state
that accounts for both social groups and collective action is open to several challenges.
First, his assertion that social groups and collective action can be fully explained in terms
of the actions and mental states of individuals is questionable given his apparent inability
to explain collective intentionality without reference to social facts. Second, the idea that
social grouphood requires sameness among the mental states of individuals is vulnerable
to the charge that it ignores differences among group members and the extent to which
these differences influence how they interpret actions and experiences. Finally, it seems
that there may be a kind of social group, namely non-voluntary social groups, that
Searle's conception of social grouphood is unable to explain.

V - Gilbert's Theory of Collective Intentionality
A response to these charges may be found in the theories of collective
intentionality and social grouphood proposed by Margaret Gilbert. Gilbert agrees with
Searle that collective intentionality cannot be fully explained in terms of individual
intentionality. However, whereas Searle contends that collective intentionality cannot be
reduced to individual intentionality because, like individual intentions, collective

Of course one may challenge the identities that are assigned to oneself. According to
Emcke, however, rejection of an undesirable identity by members of a non-voluntary
group is not sufficient to undermine that identity. "No matter how reluctant the individual
members of such groups are to accept the negative ascription or assigned membership,
their social reality - through for example, immigration law, employment policies,
marriage law, etc. - permanently forces them to acknowledge the reality of an identity
they never chose as their own." (486)
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intentions are biologically primitive psychological states that exist in the minds of
individuals, Gilbert argues that individual intentionality cannot fully explain collective
intentionality because collective intentionality requires a joint commitment. Gilbert
defines a we-intention as a shared intention to accomplish a goal or accept a proposition
as a group. A collection of individuals can share an intention if and only if they are
jointly committed to the intention. Individuals are jointly committed to an intention if and
only if they indicate and recognize one another's willingness to share responsibility for
the intention. A joint commitment cannot belong to an individual, in whole or in part, for
it only comes into being once a collection of individuals have indicated and recognized
one another's willingness to participate in the commitment. Moreover, according to
Gilbert, a joint commitment does not have parts but is instead an indivisible whole for
which all participants are equally responsible. Thus, a joint commitment cannot be fully
explained in terms of the actions and mental states of individuals. Since collective
intentionality requires a joint commitment, collective intentionality is also irreducible.77

VI - Gilbert's Theory of Social Grouphood
Gilbert also agrees with Searle that collective intentionality is a condition of
social grouphood. However, for Gilbert social grouphood involves more than merely
having a we-intention in common. She maintains that a collection of individuals share a
we-intention if and only if they are jointly committed to it. Individuals who are jointly
committed to an intention constitute a plural subject. Gilbert defines a plural subject as "a
pool or sum of wills dedicated, as one, to a certain 'cause', whether promotion of a goal
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or acceptance of a proposition or principle." Plural subjecthood is "the core condition of
collectivity existence. A social group is a plural subject."79 Thus, individuals constitute a
social group if and only if they constitute a plural subject, and they constitute a plural
subject if and only if they are jointly committed to a we-intention.
Like Searle, Gilbert maintains that, before individuals can share a we-intention
and thereby constitute a social group, they must share an understanding of themselves as
potential group members. To be jointly committed to an intention individuals must
indicate and recognize one another's willingness to be so committed. That is, they must
indicate and recognize one another's willingness to become members of a social group.
Gilbert argues that before they can indicate their own and recognize others' willingness
to become members of a social group, individuals must recognize themselves and others
as potential group members. To recognize themselves and others as potential group
members, they must have an understanding of what a social group is and what it means to
be a group member. According to Gilbert, "This means that only those with the concept
of a plural subject can help to constitute such a subject. It also means that those who
constitute a plural subject know that they do, and will thus think of themselves as ws."80
Gilbert does not share Searle's commitment to methodological individualism.
Gilbert contends that social groups cannot be fully explained in terms of the actions and
mental states of individuals because social groups cannot be fully explained without
reference to the idea of a social group. Individuals must possess the idea of a social group
to recognize one another as potential group members and indicate their willingness to
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become members of a social group. All satisfactory explanations of a social group must
refer to a collection of individuals who share an understanding of what a group is and
what it means to be a member.81
Gilbert seems to suggest that, rather than being reducible to their individual
members, social groups supervene upon their individual members. According to Paul
Sheehy,
Supervenience is the thesis that one domain of phenomena (Dl) depends entirely
on another (D2) even though there are no systematic links between them, and in
particular even though there is no causal relationship between D2 and Dl. The
state of Dl is given by the state of D2, and there can be no change in Dl without
some change in D2 (although the converse relation does not hold). Thus a group
could not alter in any respect without a change at the individual level.82
Similarly, Gregory Currie contends that social facts supervene upon individual
facts insofar as "there is a non-causal, non-reductive relation of dependence between
facts about social institutions and facts about the behaviour of individuals."83 In other
words, social facts depend upon, but are not reducible to, individual facts. He maintains
that the supervenience thesis is consistent with both the notion that social concepts are
irreducible and the idea that "the domain of individual facts is more fundamental than the
domain of social facts."84 Currie argues that the notion that social facts supervene upon
individual facts "may help us to overcome a misleading dichotomy between
individualistic and holistic ways of thinking about the social sciences."85
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Gilbert seems to agree, for she asserts that by combining the idea that social
groups depend upon their individual members with the notion that social concepts cannot
be reduced to statements about individuals and their mental states, her theory of social
grouphood is able to reconcile an "acceptable" version of individualism and an
"acceptable" version of holism.86 According to Gilbert, an acceptable account of
individualism is one that recognizes that social groups depend upon the actions and
mental states of individuals for their existence, and an acceptable account of holism is
one that claims that when a set of individuals share certain mental states they constitute
"something that is more than a conglomeration of things of the sort that there are at the
baseline. It produces 'something new', indeed, a 'new thing'."87
Thus, it seems that for Gilbert the relationship between social groups and their
individual members is one of supervenience. Social groups depend upon their individual
members for their existence. A new entity, namely a social group, with its own properties
is produced when a collection of individuals indicates and recognizes one another's
willingness to accept joint responsibility for an intention. Yet, social groups are not
reducible to their individual members, for to indicate and recognize one another's
willingness to accept joint responsibility for an intention, individuals must possess the
idea of a social group, and the idea of a social group cannot be fully explained in terms of
the actions and mental states of individuals.
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VII - Challenges to Gilbert's Theory of Social Grouphood
The Supervenience Thesis
Like Searle, Gilbert suggests that social groups consist in individuals and their
mental states and therefore depend upon their individual members for their existence.
However, unlike Searle, Gilbert is able to avoid the problems associated with
methodological individualism by endorsing the supervenience thesis and thereby
rejecting Searle's suggestion that, since social groups consist in individuals and their
mental states, social groups can be fully explained in terms of individuals and their
mental states.
Yet, like methodological individualism, the supervenience thesis has been the
subject of criticism. For example, the idea that supervenience entails an asymmetrical
dependence relation between social groups and their individual members has been
challenged by Jaegwon Kim. According to Kim, supervenience implies that social facts
co-vary with individual facts.88 He contends, however, that covariance does not entail
asymmetrical dependence. Kim argues that while the notion that social facts supervene
upon individual facts is compatible with the idea that social facts depend upon individual
facts, it does not preclude the possibility that individual facts also depend upon social
facts. Social facts and individual facts may co-vary because they are mutually
dependent.89 Moreover, Kim notes that it is possible that individual facts and social facts
co-vary, not because social facts depend upon individual facts, but because both
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individual facts and social facts depend upon some third kind of facts. Thus,
supervenience does not demonstrate that the individual is primary.
Moreover, Paul Sheehy argues that if, as Currie and Gilbert maintain, social
groups supervene upon, but are not reducible, to individuals, then social groups are either
causally autonomous (in which case their relationship to individual members is not
asymmetrical) or epiphenomenal. The notion that social groups are not reducible to
individuals suggests that social groups cannot be fully explained in terms of individuals.
In other words, social groups have properties that cannot be attributed to their individual
members. Furthermore, from the idea that social groups and their individual members covary it follows that, if a social group undergoes change, there must be a corresponding
change in its individual members. However, if the change at the level of the social group
is caused by properties belonging only to the social group, then it seems that the change
at the level of its individual members is caused by the social group. That is, the individual
level is shaped by the group level. Sheehy maintains that this possibility calls into
question the notion that social groups depend upon individual members, for "if groups
have an impact on individuals it is hard to see how they cannot be genuinely causally
relevant and difficult therefore to accept that social facts are determined asymmetrically
by individual facts."91 If social groups have causal powers, it is possible that some facts
about individuals depend upon facts about social groups.
If one is unwilling to abandon the notion that the dependence relation between
social groups and their individual members is asymmetrical, then Sheehy contends that
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the only alternative is to deny that the properties of social groups are causally effective.
This, however, results in epiphenomenalism, and according to Sheehy,
epiphenomenalism undermines the claim that social groups supervene upon, but are not
reducible to, their individual members. If the properties of social groups are not causally
effective, then it seems there is nothing about social groups that cannot be explained in
terms of their individual members. Since the properties of social groups are causally
ineffective, any event that appears to be caused by a social group must, in fact, be caused
by its individual members. Thus, supervenience becomes "a weak form of reductionism,"
and, as discussed above, it is questionable whether reductionism can demonstrate that the
individual is primary.92
The arguments proposed by Kim and Sheehy suggest that the supervenience
thesis is as problematic for Gilbert's theory of social grouphood as methodological
individualism is for Searle's conception of social grouphood. What the supervenience
thesis and methodological individualism have in common is a commitment to ontological
individualism, to the notion that the dependence relation between social groups and their
individual members is asymmetrical. It is this asymmetry that is challenged by the
opponents of methodological individualism and the supervenience thesis. This concern
with the asymmetry entailed by ontological individualism also seems to motivate the
charges of essentialism and voluntariness to which Searle's account of social grouphood
is vulnerable. As discussed above, anti-essentialist theorists argue that conceptions of
social grouphood that suggest that sameness is a condition of social grouphood fail to
account for the heterogeneity of social groups. They attribute the heterogeneity of social
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groups to differences in the social relations of group members and the influences that
these social relations have on how individual members interpret actions and experiences.
In other words, it is suggested that essentialism is problematic because it fails to account
for the possibility that social phenomena may shape the actions and mental states of
individuals.

Sameness
Given that Gilbert endorses the idea that the dependence relation between social
groups and their individual members is asymmetrical, it appears that her theory of social
grouphood is as vulnerable to charges of essentialism as Searle's. However, she may
respond that objections to essentialist claims about social grouphood are not applicable to
her position because the social entities with which feminist and cultural theorists are
concerned are not social groups. Gilbert argues that a successful account of a social group
must accord with everyday usage of the term. In other words, a successful account of
social grouphood explains what the collections of individuals we tend to identify as social
groups have in common. She claims that we would not likely include among a list of
kinds of social groups collections of randomly selected individuals, individuals who have
only a physical feature in common, or individuals who happen to inhabit the same
geographical area.93 There may be a great deal of diversity among individuals' intuitions
regarding social groups. Yet, even if we accept that most individuals would be reluctant
to include these kinds of social entities among their lists of social groups, this does not
preclude the possibility that many individuals would recognize women and cultural
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groups as social groups. Women and members of cultural groups are not randomly
selected, tend to share more than a physical feature, and need not inhabit the same
geographical area.
One could argue that women and cultural groups ought to be identified as social
groups because their members are unified by a shared way of life and common interests.
Yet, Gilbert also contends that a collection of individuals who have a shared way of life
and common interests will not satisfy intuitive conceptions of a social group. To
illustrate, she asks us to consider a population of misanthropic individuals who inhabit
and stalk one another within a large forest. These individuals have in common a life of
stalking and a common interest in causing harm to others.94 However, Gilbert believes we
would be reluctant to refer to them as a social group. It is certainly the case that a life of
stalking and a desire to harm others is not likely to bring people together. What this
demonstrates is that some ways of life and interests are inherently anti-social. It does not
follow that all ways of life and interests are insufficient to account for social grouphood.
Suppose the individuals living in the forest are healers, rather than stalkers, who share an
interest in promoting the well-being of others. Given this scenario one may be more
willing to identify the forest dwellers as a social group.
Moreover, there are concerns about essentialism raised by some feminist and
cultural theorists that cannot be dismissed by merely denying that women and cultural
groups constitute social groups. Some critics of essentialist understandings of social
grouphood maintain that one's identities are interrelated and inseparable. How one
interprets one's own and others' actions and experiences is determined by the intersection
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of one's identities. As mentioned above, Elizabeth Spelman criticizes accounts of
women's identities that are based on shared experience for implying that one's gender
identity can be separated from one's other identities. Spelman insists that the identities
that constitute a self are inseparable. Similarly, Kimberle Crenshaw argues that Black
women's experiences of violence are shaped by both their gender and their racial
identities. She maintains that the "intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black
women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at race or gender
dimensions of those experiences separately."95 Likewise, Gloria Anzaldiia argues that
individuals who belong to more than one cultural group must develop a mestiza
consciousness to reconcile the multiple, perhaps conflicting, norms, practices, and
expectations that their cultural identities entail. It is from this pluralistic perspective that
the mestiza experiences the world. As Anzaldiia states, "She has a plural personality, she
operates in a pluralistic mode - nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly,
nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns
the ambivalence into something else."96 Thus, although members of a social group may
have some experiences and some identities in common, they may, nevertheless, ascribe
different meanings to those experiences as a consequence of the identities that they do not
share.
To illustrate what this means for Gilbert's conception of social grouphood,
consider once again the example of Jack and Sue going for a walk together. Gilbert
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claims that two people going for a walk together constitute a social group. That is, "in
order to go for a walk together two persons must constitute a plural subject."97 So, for
Jack and Sue to go for a walk together, they must indicate and recognize one another's
willingness to do so. Once they have indicated and recognized one another's willingness
to go for a walk together, they have made a joint commitment that entails certain rights
and obligations. Both Jack and Sue have the right to expect that the other will behave in a
manner that is consistent with going for a walk together, and they have an obligation to
behave in a manner that is consistent with going for a walk together. According to
Gilbert, if Jack increases his pace such that he and Sue are no longer walking side by
side, then he has violated his obligation and Sue has the right to rebuke him. For Gilbert,
going for a walk together involves walking alongside one another. If Jack and Sue are not
walking alongside one another, then they are not going for a walk together.98 Thus, it
seems that if Jack and Sue are to go for a walk together, they must have the same
understanding of what it means to go for a walk together, at least insofar as they
understand it to mean that they will walk side by side. That is, they must be jointly
committed to the same understanding of the act of going for a walk together. If Jack and
Sue do not share the same understanding of what it means to go for a walk together, then,
according to Gilbert's account, even if they have indicated and recognized one another's
willingness to go for a walk together, they do not constitute a social group, for they have
not indicated a willingness to do the same thing. They have misinterpreted one another's
conduct.
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Given the differences that exist among members of a group, the degree of
homogeneity required by the theories of social grouphood developed by Searle and
Gilbert is unlikely to be achieved. Inevitably individuals belong to numerous groups and,
if one accepts the idea that one's identities are interrelated and inseparable, then, because
the other groups to which they belong may be different, members of the same social
group may ascribe different meanings to shared actions and experiences. As Linda Martin
Alcoff explains, "all group identities are internally heterogeneous...group members will
belong to a diversity of other groups as well, and thus.. .dialogical encounters across
group differences occur always within groups."99 Two people who agree to go for a walk
together may have different understandings of what that entails because there are
collective identities that they do not share. Similarly, families are likely to include
individuals who possess different gender, age, and perhaps racial and cultural, identities.
Consequently, within the same family there may be multiple, perhaps conflicting,
understandings of family members' roles and responsibilities. Hence, it seems that the
concerns articulated by anti-essentialist scholars are applicable to the conceptions of
social grouphood proposed by Searle and Gilbert.
I do not deny that sameness may be a sufficient condition of social grouphood.
There may be social groups, such as the small, temporary groups that Searle and Gilbert
tend to use as examples, that consist in shared mental states among group members.
However, given the heterogeneity of social groups, it seems unlikely that social
grouphood requires shared mental states among group members. Even so, Searle and
Gilbert may argue that social entities that are not founded on sameness do not constitute
99
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social groups. Clearly, this would severely restrict application of the term 'social group'
to the extent that it would no longer accord with our intuitions. In that case, the theories
of Searle and Gilbert would fail to satisfy the criteria established by Gilbert for a
successful account of social grouphood.

Voluntariness
The commitment of Searle and Gilbert to ontological individualism also seems to
account for the charge that their theories of social grouphood are incomplete insofar as
they are unable to explain non-voluntary social groups. Whereas the voluntary social
groups described by Searle and Gilbert suggest that social grouphood depends on the
mental states and actions of individual members, the non-voluntary social groups
described by Emcke suggest that social grouphood may also depend on the social
relations in which group members stand. As defined by Emcke, a non-voluntary social
group consists in a collection of individuals who are perceived and treated by others as
group members.
Searle and Gilbert may insist, however, that, since members of non-voluntary
groups do not recognize themselves as such, non-voluntary groups are not social groups.
Gilbert claims that a definition of social groups that includes non-voluntary groups is not
very useful because it places too much emphasis on similarities among groups and fails to
acknowledge significant differences. That is, a conception of social groups that includes
non-voluntary groups "runs the risk of not cutting nature at the joints, of lumping
together phenomena which are quite significantly different, and not very significantly the
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same."100 Non-voluntary groups may be recognized as social entities of some sort, but,
since they do not consist in individuals who indicate and recognize one another's
willingness to accept joint responsibility for a we-intention, they do not constitute plural
subjects, and therefore, do not constitute social groups.101
Emcke agrees with Gilbert that it is analytically useful to distinguish between
voluntary and non-voluntary groups.102 Nonetheless, Emcke maintains that both
voluntary and non-voluntary groups constitute social groups because both kinds of group
consist in individuals who share something that is socially significant. Members of
voluntary groups share actions, objectives, or attitudes, and members of non-voluntary
groups share constraints. However, as discussed above, Gilbert claims that shared
characteristics and experiences are not sufficient to warrant the inclusion of nonvoluntary groups in an account of social groups. She insists that the fact that members of
both voluntary and non-voluntary groups share something socially significant does not
justify the identification of non-voluntary groups as social groups, for these similarities
between voluntary and non-voluntary groups are not as important as their differences.
Yet, Gilbert's own account of social grouphood seems to suggest that the
differences between voluntary and non-voluntary social groups are not as significant as
she contends. Gilbert claims that, "It is logically necessary and sufficient for the
existence of collectives that each of a set of individuals volunteer himself, in the sense of
his will.. .He must give over his will to the group - in order to constitute the group."103
However, she also maintains that "The type of 'volunteering' at issue.. .is such that it is
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possible to be coerced into it."

Moreover, she claims that joint commitments may be

founded on implicit agreements to accept joint responsibility for an action, objective, or
attitude. Indeed, she argues that one may unconsciously indicate one's willingness to
participate in a joint commitment, such that group members may only recognize after the
fact that they have made a joint commitment and cannot explain how or when it
happened.105 Thus, according to Gilbert, one's participation in a plural subject may be
considered voluntary even if one's acceptance of joint responsibility for a we-intention
was coerced or unintentional. What is required to participate in a joint commitment is to
indicate and have recognized by other participants one's willingness to participate.
Whether or not one's indication was freely given or coerced, intentional or unintentional,
is irrelevant. If one's conduct is interpreted by other group members as an indication of
one's willingness to participate, then one has a responsibility to participate in the
performance of the action, or collective acceptance of the objective or attitude, in
question. In other words, an individual may become a member of a social group even if
he or she is not willing to do so. The individual is a member of the social group even if he
or she was forced to participate, or was unaware of his or her participation, in the
collective performance of an action or collective acceptance of an objective or attitude.
Furthermore, Gilbert suggests that a member of a voluntary social group is not
free to leave the group whenever he or she wishes to do so. Once one's willingness to
accept joint responsibility for an intention has been indicated and recognized, one has
made a joint commitment. According to Gilbert, a commitment to the performance of an
action, or acceptance of an objective or attitude, entails certain rights and
104
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responsibilities.106 Each individual who participates in a joint commitment has an
obligation to the other participants to behave in a manner that is consistent with the
commitment, and each individual who participates in a joint commitment has the right to
expect other participants to behave in a manner that is consistent with the commitment.107
Joint commitments, and the rights and responsibilities that they entail, can be cancelled if
and only if all of the participants agree to rescind the commitment.108 A group member
has an obligation to behave in a manner that is consistent with the commitment for which
he or she is partly responsible unless or until the individual is relieved of his or her
commitment and attending obligations by his or her fellow group members. If a group
member were to leave the group without the consent of the other group members, then
the group member would be violating his or her commitment to the group. Thus, it seems
that a group member who wishes to leave the group, but is unable to secure the consent of
his or her fellow group members, will remain a group member. Even if the individual no
longer recognizes or behaves in accordance with the group commitment, he or she may
be perceived and treated by other members of the group, not as a former member, but
rather as a member who has failed to fulfil his or her responsibilities. What was once a
voluntary identity becomes a non-voluntary one.
Gilbert maintains that plural subjects, and thus social groups, must be voluntary,
and yet the distinction between voluntary groups, as defined by Gilbert, and nonvoluntary groups, as defined by Emcke, is not very clear. Gilbert claims that a collection
of individuals may constitute a social group even if they are not willing to accept joint
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responsibility for an action, objective, or attitude, and she argues that group members
cannot unilaterally rescind their membership. Similarly, Emcke claims that a collection of
individuals may become members of a non-voluntary group even if they are not willing
to do so, and that members of a non-voluntary group are not free to leave the group. In
both cases, individuals may have group memberships imposed upon them and, once
individuals become group members, they may be unable to leave the group. These
similarities support Emcke's suggestion that social group membership may be more or
less voluntary. Indeed, she argues that it may be appropriate to describe some social
groups as both voluntary and non-voluntary. One may willingly identify oneself as a
member of a social group under one description and have a different understanding of
group membership imposed upon oneself by others. For example, one may associate
being a wife with equal partnership in a marriage and willingly identify oneself as such.
At the same, an understanding of wives as subservient to their partners may be imposed
by others. Thus, Emcke concludes that, "The boundaries between constructed and chosen
identities are porous and passable."109
Despite Gilbert's assertions to the contrary, it appears that at least some voluntary
and non-voluntary groups are significantly the same, and not significantly different. In
the case of voluntary and non-voluntary social groups, it seems that social groups and
their individual members are mutually dependent. While the existence of social groups
may be attributable to the actions and mental states of their individual members, as
ontological individualism suggests, the actions and mental states of individuals are
influenced by the social groups to which they belong, specifically by the social rules,
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expectations, and practices that both voluntary and non-voluntary group memberships
entail.
Kwame Anthony Appiah refers to these social rules, expectations, and practices
as scripts. Scripts are notions of how persons who occupy particular identities ought to
behave.110 Individuals use these scripts to interpret and assess the significance of their
own and others' actions and experiences. As Appiah states, "these ideas shape the ways
people conceive of themselves and their projects. So the labels operate to mold what we
may call identification, the process through which individuals shape their projects including their plans for their own lives and their conceptions of the good life - by
reference to available labels, available identities."111 Moreover, according to Ian Hacking,
collective identities influence how one is perceived and treated by others. As he explains,
"calling A H may make us treat A differently, just calling Z N may make us do
something to Z. We may reward or jail, instruct or abduct."112 Thus, one's actions and
experiences will be interpreted both by oneself and by others in relation to one's
identities (both voluntary and non-voluntary) and the social rules, expectations, and
practices associated with them.
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VIII - Conclusion
There are significant differences between the theories of collective intentionality
and social grouphood proposed by Searle and Gilbert. Searle describes collective
intentionality as an intention to do something as a group. Such we-intentions exist in the
minds of individuals, just like I-intentions. Gilbert, on the other hand, argues that
collective intentionality is a state of affairs that arises when individuals indicate and
recognize one another's willingness to accept joint responsibility for an action, attitude,
or objective. Moreover, whereas Searle maintains that a social group consists in a
collection of individuals who possess the same mental state, specifically the same weintention, Gilbert contends that individuals must be jointly committed to a we-intention to
constitute a social group.
There are also significant similarities between the theories of Searle and Gilbert.
Searle and Gilbert agree that collective intentionality is a condition of social grouphood
and that collective intentionality is irreducible insofar as it cannot be fully explained in
terms of individual intentionality. They also agree that the dependence relation between
social groups and their individual members is asymmetrical such that the individual is
primary. I have suggested that, as a consequence of their commitment to ontological
individualism, the otherwise different conceptions of social grouphood endorsed by
Searle and Gilbert face similar challenges.
From the notion that social groups consist in individuals and their mental states,
Searle concludes that social groups can be fully explained in terms of individuals and
their mental states. Yet, opponents of methodological individualism argue that this
conclusion does not necessarily follow because it 1) mistakenly assumes that social
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phenomena are identical with facts about individuals and 2) fails to recognize that
descriptions about individual facts tend to presuppose social facts. I argued that Searle
can avoid the first charge by endorsing token identity theory. However, an endorsement
of token identity theory is inconsistent with his claim that we are born with the capacity
to recognize ourselves and one another as potential group members and makes him
vulnerable to the second charge.
Gilbert avoids both arguments against methodological individualism by
suggesting that social groups supervene upon, but are not reducible to, their individual
members. Social groups depend upon their individual members for their existence such
that the individual is primary, but social groups cannot be fully explained in terms of the
actions and mental states of individuals because individuals must possess the idea of a
social group before they can become a social group. However, Kim and Sheehy contend
that from the supervenience thesis it does not necessarily follow that the dependence
relation between social groups and their individual members is asymmetrical. The
supervenience thesis is consistent with the notion that social groups and their individual
members are mutually dependent.
The notion that social groups and their individual members are mutually
dependent is also implied by anti-essentialist theorists and the idea of non-voluntary
social groups. Anti-essentialist theorists argue that the actions and mental states of
individuals are influenced by the social groups to which they belong. Similarly, Emcke's
theory of non-voluntary social groups suggests that one's group memberships are
determined, at least in part, by the social relations in which one stands. Conversely,
Searle and Gilbert suggest that sameness is a condition of social grouphood and that
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social groups are necessarily voluntary. Consequently, they may be accused of failing to
take into account the extent to which social groups influence their individual members.
Thus, the commitment to ontological individualism shared by Searle and Gilbert
may prove problematic for their conceptions of social grouphood and for their theories of
collective action, since they agree that social grouphood is a condition of collective
action. In the chapters that follow I will examine theories of collective action and social
grouphood that do not presuppose ontological individualism.
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Chapter Two: Social Relations, Intentionality and Social Grouphood
I - Introduction
In Chapter One I examined theories of social grouphood that suggest that
individuals constitute a social group when they possess the same mental states. Although
these theories were able to support the notion that it is appropriate to ascribe moral
responsibility to collectives, they were found wanting since they were unable to
adequately account for the causal powers of social groups, non-voluntary social groups
and differences among group members.
In this chapter I will examine Larry May's conception of social grouphood, which
claims that social groups are nothing more than interrelated individuals. The relations in
which individuals stand allow them to possess mental states and engage in activities that
they could not otherwise. Since these mental states and actions issue from the relations
that obtain among their individual members, May contends that it is appropriate to
ascribe actions, and moral responsibility for them, to collectives.
Like Searle and Gilbert, May suggests that social grouphood requires sameness,
specifically sameness among the properties of individuals. Consequently, May's theory is
vulnerable to challenges from feminist and cultural theorists. I will argue, however, that a
dialogical conception of collective identity points to ways in which May's theory may be
modified so as to avoid these charges. Still, there are other difficulties that May's account
must confront. Specifically, I will contend that as a result of his assertion that social
groups are nothing more than interrelated individuals, May is unable to differentiate
individual and collective action, and consequently is unable to provide adequate support
to claims of collective moral responsibility.
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II - May's Theory of Collective Intentionality
Larry May argues that it is appropriate to ascribe moral responsibility to
collectives. May claims that collective moral responsibility cannot be fully explained in
terms of individual moral responsibility because there are collective actions that cannot
be fully explained in terms of the actions of individuals.113 Both organized collectives,
such as corporations, and unorganized collectives, such as mobs, are capable of collective
action, and, in both cases, the capacity for collective action is a consequence of the
relations that obtain among their members.114 According to May, it is appropriate to
describe the acts of employees as the acts of the corporation when the employees are
acting in accordance with their corporate roles.115 In these instances, the organizational
structure of the corporation shapes the behaviour of the employees to the extent that it
encourages certain intentions and discourages others. Moreover, the intentions that
corporate relations promote differ from the intentions that employees are likely to
formulate outside of the organizational structure. Therefore, May concludes that it is
appropriate to ascribe these intentions, and the actions that issue from them, to the
corporation. Corporate intentionality cannot be fully explained in terms of individual
intentionality because it is a function of the organizational structures in which individual
employees are embedded.116
Although unorganized collectives, such as mobs, lack the kind of organizational
structure that accounts for corporate intentionality, May insists that they are capable of
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collective intentionahty. Collective intentionality obtains among members of an
unorganized collective when they possess the same intention. The intention that they
share may be either reflective or pre-reflective. Pre-reflective intentions are "intentions
which are not yet fixed as 'my intentions' but which motivate me toward purposive
action."117 Both reflective and pre-reflective intentions emerge from relationships of
solidarity, from shared feelings of interest and concern for fellow group members.118
Solidarity is achieved when individuals recognize that they share an interest, either an
interest in pursuing a common objective or an interest in how fellow group members are
perceived and treated by others. All group members have an interest in how their fellows
are perceived and treated by non-members, even if their own actions and opportunities
are not directly affected. According to May, "This interest in common because it is true
for each person who thinks about it, for it is not based on subjective but objective
conditions - namely, how the other is reacting toward each member of the group, qua
member, not qua individual."119 To recognize that they share an interest and thereby
achieve solidarity, individuals must first recognize themselves as group members. That is,
they must recognize that they have "a common characteristic" that "makes them all
members of the same group."120 It is this shared awareness of themselves as the same, as
interchangeable, that accounts for the commonality of their interest. Once group members
become aware that they share an interest, feelings of solidarity emerge and shared
intentions are formed. These intentions may be described as collective because they are
products of the relations that obtain among members of the collective. As May states,
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"The sameness of intention is collective in the sense that it is caused by the group
structure, that is, it is group-based."121
According to May, "to say that there are collective intentions proper, that is, to
say that the group can intend in just the same way that individual persons can intend, is a
fiction."122 He claims, however, that it is appropriate to describe as collective an intention
that emerges from the social relations in which individuals stand. Thus, May agrees with
Gilbert that 'collective intentionality' refers to a state of affairs rather than a mental state.
However, whereas Gilbert argues that collective intentionality is a condition of social
grouphood, May suggests that social grouphood is a condition of collective intentionality.

Ill - May's Theory of Social Grouphood
May contends that social groups consist in "individuals in relationships," and it is
from corporate organizational structures or relationships of solidarity that corporate and
collective intentions emerge.123 These relationships account for the unity that obtains
among group members, and for their capacity for joint action and common interests. He
claims that, "In this sense social relationships have a reality which is distinct from
individual human persons."124 One must refer to these relationships to fully explain the
actions and mental states of individuals. As May states, "Concepts such as 'being poor',
'cashing a check', etc., require some reference to the interconnections among individuals,
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not just the individuals themselves."125 He concludes, therefore, that social relationships
are irreducible.
While social relationships may be irreducible, social groups are not. According to
May, '"relations' among individuals do have a reality, a distinct ontological status which
is different from the individuals who are so related. However, the reality of these
relations is not sufficient to ensure that the groups, which are composed of individuals in
relationships, have reality independently of the individuals who compose these
groups."126 Thus, "groups do not exist independently of the persons who are members of
the group."

Indeed, May describes social groups as "fictional entities."

As a

consequence of the social relationships that obtain among individuals, "it is possible for
the actions of these individuals to be treated as if they were the actions of a single
entity."129 He continues, "the activities of each of the members are brought together so
that it appears that the members have fused together into a single individual.. .There has
not really been such a change."130 Thus, to explain certain social phenomena one may
posit social groups. However, social group concepts are merely means of referring to
individuals in relationships.131
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IV - Challenges to May's Theory of Social Grouphood
In Chapter One I argued that the theories of social grouphood proposed by Searle
and Gilbert are problematic as a consequence of their commitment to ontological
individualism. The notion that the dependence relation between social groups and their
individual members is asymmetrical insofar as the actions and mental states of individual
members are primary is inconsistent with the conception of non-voluntary social
grouphood developed by Emcke. According to Emcke, individuals who are perceived and
treated by others as the same constitute a non-voluntary social group. That is, nonvoluntary social grouphood is determined by the social relations in which individuals
stand rather than the actions and mental states of individual group members.
May appears to acknowledge the possibility of non-voluntary social groups, for he
claims that a collection of individuals who are perceived and treated by others as
interchangeable group members have a common interest and thereby constitute a social
group. Members of a social group need not be aware of the interest that they share or
share feelings of solidarity. That is, they need not be aware of the collective identity that
has been imposed upon them or the social constraints that it entails. The fact that
individuals are subject to the same treatment is sufficient to account for their status as a
social group.132 However, without a sense of solidarity, group members are unable to
formulate collective intentions and, therefore, are unable to engage in joint action.
Moreover, like Emcke, May suggests that social groups may be both voluntary and nonvoluntary. Group members who are subject to the same treatment by non-members may
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come to recognize their common interest, develop feelings of solidarity and engage in
joint action.133
In Chapter One I also suggested that, as a consequence of their commitment to
ontological individualism, the theories of Searle and Gilbert may be rejected by feminist
and cultural scholars who argue that theories that associate social grouphood with
sameness are problematic. These scholars suggest that when sameness is emphasized
important differences among group members are ignored. There are differences among
the social relations in which group members are embedded and, as a result, there are
differences among their interpretative frameworks. As a consequence of differences
among their interpretive frameworks, group members are likely to ascribe different
meanings to the same actions and experiences. Thus, the level of homogeneity assumed
by theories that identify sameness as a necessary condition of social grouphood is
unlikely to be achieved.
May acknowledges that the actions and experiences of individuals are influenced
by the social relations in which they stand. He claims that social relations "structure or
unify a group of individual human persons so that these persons can act and have
interests in different ways than they could on their own."134 Social relations influence the
actions and mental states of individuals insofar as they make it possible for individuals to
do and experience things that they otherwise could not, such as share interests, formulate
collective intentions and engage in collective action. However, in the case of unorganized
collectives, May claims that the social relations that account for collective intentionality
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and action depend, ultimately, on sameness among the properties and mental states of
individuals.
May contends that the relationship that must obtain among individuals to
constitute a social group is solidarity, and he claims that solidarity emerges when
individuals recognize that they are the same in some way. May suggests that what allows
individuals to recognize that they are the same are the properties that they in fact share.
He argues that a collection of individuals waiting at a bus stop may develop feelings of
solidarity when they recognize that "each is merely an instance of the common
characteristic 'being a bus rider'."135 May and co-author Marilyn Friedman make a
similar assertion in "Harming Women as a Group." They state that "Shared groupdefining properties make it possible for people to recognize that they are 'birds of a
feather' and to flock together, develop a sense of community, act in concert, be treated
similarly by outsiders, and, in general, to interact and interrelate in ways which may
constitute for them joint interests, a shared history, and a common destiny."136 For
example, it is possible for women to recognize themselves as the same, develop feelings
of solidarity and engage in joint action because they possess "biological characteristics
which distinguish members of this group from men."137 Similarly, it is possible for redheaded persons to recognize themselves as the same because they possess "the properties
of being biologically human and having hair which reflects light of wavelengths within a
certain specifiable range."138 The relationships of solidarity that account for the unity of
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otherwise unorganized collectives depend on the properties and mental states of
individual members. When individuals possess the same properties and these
commonalities are recognized, then solidarity may emerge. However, according to May,
the relations that emerge are irreducible for they cannot be fully explained without
reference to social facts. Thus, he seems to suggest that social relations, such as
solidarity, supervene on the properties and mental states of individuals. That is, social
relations depend on, but are not reducible to, the properties and mental states of
individuals.
As discussed in Chapter One, Jaegwon Kim and Paul Sheehy contend that the
supervenience thesis does not entail ontological individualism. They insist that the notion
that social relations depend on the properties and mental states of individuals is consistent
with the idea that the properties and mental states of individuals depend on social
relations. However, this is not what May seems to be suggesting. Rather, he implies that
what accounts for group members' recognition of themselves as the same, and, thus, the
group-constituting relations in which they stand, is sameness among the properties that
they possess. There is no mention of the possibility that group members' understanding
of themselves as such is influenced by the social relations in which they stand. Thus, like
Searle and Gilbert, May suggests that the dependence relation between social groups and
their individual members is asymmetrical.

V - Cudd's Theory of Social Grouphood
Ann E. Cudd suggests that her account of social grouphood can avoid the charges
of feminist and cultural scholars. She proposes a conception of social grouphood that is
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similar to the theory developed by May. Like May, Cudd suggests that social groups are
"nothing more than individuals and their interactions," and that the interactions that
obtain among individuals supervene on, but cannot be fully explained in terms of, the
mental states of individuals.139 However, whereas May suggests that sameness among the
properties and mental states of individuals is a condition of social grouphood, Cudd
maintains that social grouphood requires sameness among the social constraints to which
individuals are subject. According to Cudd, a collection of individuals constitutes a social
group if they are subject to the same social constraints. They become subject to the same
social constraints when they identify themselves or are identified by others as the same in
some significant way, that is, when they are identified as group members.
Like Gilbert, Cudd suggests that voluntary social groups consist in collections of
individuals who are jointly committed to an action, objective, or attitude. Cudd also
agrees with Gilbert that individuals must share an understanding of themselves as (at
least potential) group members before they can express their willingness to participate in
a joint commitment.140 Once they have indicated their willingness to participate,
members of voluntary social groups become subject to the same social constraints. Their
actions "create norms that constrain their subsequent actions."141 Thus, according to
Cudd, a voluntary social group consists in a collection of individuals whose actions are
constrained by social norms, expectations, and practices that have arisen as a
consequence of their own previous actions.
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Unlike Gilbert, Cudd argues that social groups may also be non-voluntary. Nonvoluntary social groups consist in individuals who are recognized by others as the same
in some significant way, such as gender, race, class, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.142
These categories may be associated with certain assumptions about persons to whom they
apply, such as notions that "Women are relatively small and weak, Asians are good
mathematicians, African Americans are from the South or the inner city, gay men are
effeminate, women and minority professors got their jobs to fill affirmative action
quotas."143 These assumptions inform the actions of others, and from these actions social
norms, expectations, and practices emerge that constrain the actions and opportunities of
non-voluntary group members.144 Thus, a non-voluntary social group consists in a
collection of individuals whose actions and opportunities are constrained by social facts
that have arisen as a consequence of the actions of others. Individuals become subject to
these constraints, and thereby become non-voluntary group members, if and only if they
are identified and treated by others as group members.
Cudd suggests that an understanding of social grouphood founded on shared
social constraints is able to avoid the charges of essentialism to which May's theory is
vulnerable because it does not require that group members possess the same properties or
perspectives.145 Rather, it is because they are subject to the same social constraints that
they constitute a social group. Iris Marion Young makes a similar claim in "Gender as
Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective." Young argues that, although
there are no attributes or experiences that all women share and on the basis of which a
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common identity may be established, women may be considered members of the same
series because they occupy the same location relative to social objects and practices.146 In
other words, like Cudd, Young suggests that women constitute a collective insofar as
they are subject to the same social constraints.
Young offers her understanding of women as a series as an alternative to
essentialist conceptions of gender.147 Yet, Alison Stone argues that Young's theory is
essentialist insofar as it suggests that serial membership requires sameness. Young claims
that women constitute a series because they are "oriented around the same objects or
practico-inert structures," in particular "enforced heterosexuality and the sexual division
of labour."148 According to Stone, this suggests that there are "certain universal norms
that constitute all women as women."149 However, Young also argues that multiple,
perhaps conflicting, meanings may be associated with the social structures that define
women as a series.150 Stone contends that the possibility that heterosexuality and the
sexual division of labour may have different meanings in different contexts undermines
Young's contention that women may be unified on the basis of shared social constraints.
Stone claims that Young "can only retain a coherent feminine gender by arguing that,
although women have no common features, there are common features—common
expectations—organizing all the social realities that constrain women's lives."151 Thus,
according to Stone, Young's conception of gender as a series requires a kind of sameness
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that is incompatible with the notion that the same social constraints may be interpreted
differently in different contexts. It requires sameness among the social norms,
expectations, and practices to which the actions and opportunities of women are subject.
Cudd denies that a requirement of sameness among the social constraints faced by
group members is problematic. She admits that her conception of social grouphood
"supposes that in the world there are constraints that apply to all women, others to all
men, others to all African Americans, and so forth."152 Yet, this seems unlikely when one
considers the kinds of social facts that she includes among her list of social constraints. It
is certainly not the case that all women possess the same legal rights, wealth, income, or
social status. Cudd suggests that it is common for women to be perceived as "relatively
small and weak."153 It is unlikely, however, that this perception of women is universal,
and even where it is pervasive, there may be differences in how it manifests itself in
terms of social norms and practices. This is what Young acknowledges when she claims
that different meanings may be ascribed to the same social constraints. And, as Stone
argues, this acknowledgement of difference is incompatible with the notion that sameness
among the social constraints to which group members are subject accounts for their unity.
So, either it is not the case the different meanings may be ascribed to the same social
constraints, or it is the not the case that individuals must face the same social constraints
to constitute a social group.
Cudd is more likely to support the first option for she insists that only shared
social constraints can explain similarities among the social outcomes of group members.
She claims that even though there are significant differences among group members,
152
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there are also similarities in social outcomes, such as income and life expectancy, which
give us "reason to believe that some systematic social constraint is in operation."154 Cudd
maintains that there are "patterns of differences in social constraints," such that, for
example, "Over a wide range of measures of social outcomes, being a man and black
leads to more and better choices than being a woman and black."155 The extent to which
the actions and opportunities of group members are constrained may differ as a
consequence of differences among their other group memberships. Nevertheless, because
they are identified as the same, group members are subject the same constraints, just to a
different degree.
To support her own position Cudd refers to Susan Moller Okin's "Gender
Inequality and Cultural Differences." According to Okin, empirical evidence suggests
that women from different cultures, races, and classes experience the same kinds of abuse
and discrimination. As she states, "From place to place, from class to class, from race to
race, and from culture to culture, we find similarities in the specifics of these inequalities,
in their causes and their effects, although often not in their extent or severity."156 Okin
argues that "gender itself is an extremely important category of analysis and that we
ought not be paralyzed by the fact that there are differences among women. So long as
we are careful and develop our judgments in the light of empirical evidence, it is possible
to generalize about many aspects of inequality between the sexes."157 Cudd agrees with
Okin that placing too much emphasis on differences among group members may obscure
154
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important similarities, specifically similarities among the social constraints to which they
are subject.158 Moreover, like Okin, Cudd maintains that these similarities become
apparent when one examines empirical evidence pertaining to the social outcomes of
group members.159
While it may be the case that there are similarities among the social outcomes of
group members, it does not follow that these similarities are attributable to similarities
among the social constraints to which they are subject. First, social outcomes may be
influenced by factors other than social constraints. Cudd claims that, in addition to social
constraints, individual actions are subject to biological, psychological and physical
constraints.160 Social outcomes may be shaped by these other variables. Second, the same
social constraints may produce different social outcomes. As Young argues, different
meanings may be ascribed to the same social norms, expectations, and practices in
different contexts. She claims that "individuals can relate to these social positionings in
different ways; the same person may relate to them in different ways in different social
contexts or at different times in their lives."161 How one interprets social norms,
expectations, and practices will influence one's actions, and one's actions may influence
one's social outcomes. Finally, similar social outcomes may be attributable to different
social constraints. Although Cudd denies the possibility that the set of social constraints
associated with a particular kind of group membership change when they interact with
other social constraints, she accepts that one set of social constraints may influence the
extent to which one's actions and opportunities are constrained by another set. To
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illustrate, she notes that the wage gap between men and women is greater between white
men and women than it is between black men and women. She maintains that interaction
between the constraints associated with race and gender account for this discrepancy.
While men are in a more privileged position than women when it comes to wages, as a
consequence of their race, black men are not as privileged as white men. Despite this
interaction, Cudd contends that differences among the social outcomes of men and
women, and black people and white people, can be discerned, and she insists that these
differences are attributable to differences in the constraints to which their actions and
opportunities are subject. She admits, however, that, while we can appreciate that both
being black and being a woman have a negative impact on one's earnings, we cannot
discern from social outcomes which set of constraints has the greatest influence.

If, as

Cudd acknowledges, social outcomes are influenced by different combinations of sets of
social constraints and we cannot know the extent of the influence of each set, then it is
unclear how one can attribute similarities among social outcomes to shared social
constraints. In her example she notes that income may be influenced by both race and
gender. Yet, it may also be influenced by ethnicity, geographic location, education,
marital status, whether or not one has children, etc., and all of these identities entail
different sets of social constraints. It is possible that different sets of constraints, or
different combinations of sets of constraints, exert a similar influence on income. Thus,
individuals whose actions and experiences are subject to different social constraints may,
nevertheless, have similar incomes. Similarities among social outcomes do not
necessarily correspond to similarities among social constraints. I am not denying that

Cudd, 48.
66

there are patterns of difference when social outcomes are examined on the basis of
gender, race, ethnicity, etc. What I am denying is that these patterns can be attributed to
shared social constraints since the extent to which the constraints associated with gender,
race, ethnicity, etc. shape social outcomes may be influenced by, and cannot be isolated
from, other variables.

VI - Difference and Social Unity
Sameness is a feature of, and persistent problem for, the theories of social
grouphood proposed by Cudd and May. It becomes a problem when one takes into
account the fact that the same property or social constraint may have different meanings
ascribed to it. This is acknowledged in the account of collective identity proposed by Jose
Medina. Like Cudd and May, Medina suggests that a social group consists in a collection
of individuals who share an understanding of themselves, or are identified by others, as
group members. However, unlike Cudd and May, Medina recognizes that individuals
may possess different understandings of what it means to be a group member as a
consequence of differences among the values, commitments, and identifications that they
endorse.
Medina argues that one learns from one's significant others how to discern
similarities and differences among individuals. That is, one's perceptions of similarities
and differences are shaped by the values, norms, commitments, and identifications that
one acquires from one's significant others and accepts as one's own.163 Thus, whether or
not one perceives an action or experience as significant is determined by one's
163
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interpretive framework. Since there are differences among the interpretive frameworks
that individuals endorse, it is possible for individuals to have different interpretations of
the same events or circumstances. Consequently, Medina suggests that what is required
for individuals to share an understanding of themselves as the same is not sameness
among their properties or circumstances, but rather sameness among their interpretative
frameworks.
Like May, Medina believes that perceived similarities among individuals are what
account for the unity of social groups. However, Medina argues that it need not be the
case that all group members share the same property to constitute a social group. Rather,
it may be multiple similarities that account for group cohesion. As Medina explains, like
family members, group members may "resemble one another in many different ways:
some may have similar hair, others similar noses, others may share particular ways of
talking, or similar laughter, etc.. .there is nothing in particular that all their members must
have: they simply exhibit some similarities, they share certain 'family resemblances', but
there is no fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions that determines
membership."164
To achieve a collective identity such similarities, or areas of overlap, among
group members must be recognized, and, according to Medina, the perception of
similarity entails an awareness of difference. What accounts for the unity of a social
group are perceived similarities among group members, and perceived differences
between group members and non-members. Differences among group members are
disregarded while differences between members and non-members are emphasized. He
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concludes that "similarity operates in a context of difference in a double sense: things are
regarded as similar against the background of differences in other respects as well as
differences in the relevant respect that are considered negligible and are in fact
neglected."165 Thus, social groups are heterogeneous insofar as there are differences
among group members and they are unified to the extent that these differences are
perceived as less significant than their similarities. Moreover, social groups are unstable
since the similarities and differences that define social groups are subject to change. As
Medina states, "differences that today set apart one family from another may become
inconsequential tomorrow; and, on the other hand, internal differences that are considered
negligible today may grow to be important differences tomorrow, even to the point of
excluding individuals from membership in the family."166 Social groups are unstable
because what is recognized as socially significant is subject to change.
Similarly, Kay Mathiesen and David Carr suggest that, since there are likely to be
differences among the interpretive frameworks of group members, areas of overlap or
sameness among their perspectives, rather than sameness among their properties, is what
accounts for social unity. According to Mathiesen, "individuals can form a collective
when they adopt a.firstperson plural perspective defined by a shared collective selfconcept, which specifies the collective's history, beliefs, aspirations, and other
characteristics."167 In other words, to constitute a collective individuals must share an
understanding of themselves as members of a 'we' or an 'us', and to share an
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understanding of themselves as members of a collective, individuals must first share an
understanding of what it means to be a member of the collective. Mathiesen claims that
"This collective self-concept allows members of a collective to think and act in terms of
their membership in the collective by giving a particular content to the identity of that
collective. It provides a picture of who 'we' are so that the members can have something
specific and in common in mind when they take the perspective of the collective."168
Mathiesen maintains that membership criteria must be negotiated by members of
the collective and may include possession of certain attributes, a particular kind of
relationship to a geographical region, or adherence to certain norms, expectations, and
practices.169 She notes that members of a collective may have different ideas about what
membership requires. She argues, however, that there must be some overlap among their
perspectives to achieve a shared collective self-concept and thereby share an
understanding of themselves as group members. That is, to constitute a collective there
must be some degree of sameness among the perspectives of group members. There must
be commonalities among members' conceptions of what it means to be a member of the
collective.170
David Carr agrees with Mathiesen that to constitute a social group a collection of
individuals must be identified as group members. If individuals recognize themselves as a
group, then they constitute a subjective social group. According to Carr, for members of
such a group-subject to recognize themselves as a group they must share a meaningful
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action or experience.171 Although a collection of individuals at a street corner waiting for
the traffic light to change may recognize that they share the experience of occupying the
same space and the objective of crossing the street, they do not constitute a group-subject
because they do not perceive their shared circumstances as significant. On the other hand,
a collection of individuals who are working, or plan to work, collaboratively to build a
house and recognize as significant the fact that they have this action or objective in
common constitute a group-subject.172 Similarly, a collection of individuals who
experience the same event, such as a football game, traffic accident, or attack, and
recognize as significant the fact that they are experiencing the same event constitute a
group-subject.173
Carr claims that to share an action or experience is to share a narrative. Narrative
structure is the primary means by which one interprets one's own and others' actions and
experiences because narrative structure is "inherent in human experience and action."174
Specifically, it is the temporal dimension of human experience that is narrative in form.
All events, no matter how short in duration, take time. Therefore, like narratives, they
may be described as having a beginning, a middle, and an end. Although events take
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place over time, Carr maintains that we experience them as integrated wholes, "as
configurations."175
Since the events that we experience tend to be parts of more enduring, integrated
wholes that extend both into the past and into the future, the significance of the parts is a
function of the contribution that they make to the whole. If the parts of the event that
occur in the future differ from what was anticipated or intended, the significance of the
whole, and therefore, the significance of the past components of the event, changes. The
integrated event, or configuration, becomes something else, and our past experiences
become parts of a different whole. Thus, according to Carr, "many of the temporal
wholes whose parts we experience are configurations destined never to be realized and
indeed, in a certain sense, configurations which never existed 'except in our minds.'"176
Even when their significance changes, we continue to experience the temporal phases of
events as parts of an integrated whole that extends into the future. The "present and past
are experienced as a function of what will be."177
Like the events recounted in historical and literary narratives, the events of one's
life are experienced as integrated wholes that take place over time. Narratives and
experiences share the same structure, and, in both cases, this structure determines the
meaning of the events. Unlike historical and literary narratives, however, the structures of
most human experiences are not self-consciously imposed. Rather, they "exist for the
experiencer or the agent in the process of experiencing or acting; they constitute the
meaningfulness or direction of the experience or action; it is in virtue of them that these
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things 'make sense' prior to and independently of our reflecting on them and explicitly
recounting them to ourselves or to others."178
There are, however, some events that take place over such a long period of time,
have so many components, or have "disparate and temporally discrete parts" that their
significance cannot be comprehended without "recollection and reflection."179 In such
cases, one deliberately organizes the components into an integrated whole. Still,
experiences of short-term events and experiences of long-term events share the same
narrative structure, and the narrative structure serves the same function, namely
organizing the components of the event into a unified whole. The "only important
difference" between these experiences, according to Carr, is the "conscious stance" of the
agent.180 In the case of long-term events, the agent recollects, reflects upon, and organizes
the past, present, and anticipated future components into a unified, coherent whole.
Like the actions and experiences of an individual, the shared actions and
experiences that unite a social group have temporal depth, and therefore, have an inherent
narrative structure.181 That is, actions and experiences that group members share take
place over time such that they may be described as having a beginning, a middle, and an
end. Group members experience the temporal phases of their shared events as parts of
integrated wholes that extend both into the past and into the future.182 Moreover, the
actions and experiences that group members share constitute the life of the group, and
like actions and experiences, the life of the group has temporal depth. Consequently,
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group members experience the life of the group as an integrated whole with a past, a
present, and a future. This narrative configuration constitutes the identity of the groupsubject.183
What distinguishes individual actions and experiences from collective actions and
experiences are the subjects of the narratives constructed to organize and give meaning to
the events. Narratives that explain the actions and experiences of individuals refer to
individual subjects, whereas narratives that account for the actions and experiences of
group-subjects refer to group-subjects. An action or experience is shared if a collection of
individuals accepts a narrative about the event that refers to the collective. That is, they
constitute a 'we' if they accept a narrative that identifies them as a 'we'. 184
Carr contends that group members are responsible for the identity-constituting
narrative of a group-subject. The story of the group-subject "is told, acted out, and
received and accepted in a kind of self-reflective social narration."185 It need not be the
case, however, that all group members contribute to the narrative that constitutes their
collective identity. Group members who hold positions of power and authority may be
recognized by their peers as responsible for identity-constituting narrative composition.
According to Carr, "He or she may tell the story, but it is 'our' story that is told."186 The
story that is told must be accepted by group members to constitute the identity of a group-
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subject. Group members "must believe or accept it as the genuine account of what the
group is and what it is doing."187 A collection of individuals constitutes a group-subject if
and only if they accept the same story of the actions and experiences that they have
shared. As Carr states, "It is their acceptance that makes them members, constitutes their
recognition of others as fellow members, and determines their participation in the action,
experience, and life of the community."188
Carr suggests that to share a narrative the interpretive frameworks of group
members must coincide. To share a narrative is to share an understanding of the actions
and experiences that constitute the life of the group. The significance that one ascribes to
an event is determined by the values, norms, commitments, and identifications that one
acquires from one's significant others and accepts as one's own. Therefore, to share an
understanding of the group's actions and experiences group members must endorse
similar values, norms, commitments, and identifications. It is in accordance with these
frameworks that the meanings of group members' shared actions and experiences are
determined. Thus, Carr contends that underlying every shared action and experience is a
"single system of interlocking perspectives on the common world."189 He claims that,
"The existence and identity of a group-subject seems nothing but a series of overlapping
projections made from different but concurring points of view, those of the individuals
involved."190 Group-subjects are heterogeneous insofar as group members endorse
different interpretive frameworks, and they are unified to the extent that the interpretive
frameworks to which group members are committed overlap.
187
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Carr acknowledges, however, that since there may be multiple, perhaps
conflicting, perspectives from which the same actions and experiences may be
interpreted, multiple, perhaps conflicting, identity-constituting narratives may be
constructed.191 Nonetheless, he maintains that, if group members recognize one another
as such, then "there must be some sense of a common story."192 So, Canadians may
disagree about which federal political party tells the most accurate story about Canada
and being a Canadian and still recognize one another as Canadians. As long as there are
some significant commonalities among the different narratives and underlying
interpretive frameworks to which Canadians subscribe, such disagreement need not
threaten the unity of the country. However, when group members endorse significantly
different values, norms, commitments, and identifications such that they no longer
ascribe the same meaning to events, it is unlikely that the group will survive. Thus,
separatist movements threaten the survival of nation-states because those who participate
in the movements reject the dominant groups' interpretation of events.193 Moreover, the
narrative that constitutes the identity of a group-subject must be revised frequently to
accommodate new actions and experiences, and new interpretations of past actions and
experiences. The continued existence of the group depends upon group members'
acceptance of these revisions. Yet, each revision provides an opportunity for
disagreement.194 Consequently, group-subjects are inherently unstable. Carr contends
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that, a "sense of finitude and fragility is part of any community's existence because of the
latter's dependence on the attitudes and interests of the individuals that make it up."195
Medina, Mathiesen and Carr suggest is that it is not actual sameness, but a shared
perception of sameness that is required to achieve social unity. For individuals to share an
understanding of themselves or others as group members, there must be areas of overlap
among their interpretative frameworks. One may argue, however, that the idea that social
grouphood requires overlap among the perspectives of individuals still implies that social
grouphood requires sameness. Like Cudd and May, Medina, Mathiesen and Carr suggest
that social grouphood requires that individuals share an understanding of themselves as
group members. Whereas May claims that this kind of shared understanding supervenes
on sameness among individual properties and Cudd argues that it emerges from sameness
among individual circumstances, Medina, Mathiesen and Carr contend that it is a product
of sameness among individual perspectives. Indeed, Medina, Mathiesen and Carr suggest
that the inevitable differences among the perspectives of individuals pose a constant
threat to social unity. However, a dialogical model of identity suggests an interpretation
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of the idea of overlapping perspectives that does not entail sameness, and therefore, is
compatible with difference.

VII - Dialogue and Identity
The notion that identities are dialogical is popular among theorists who endorse a
narrative understanding of personal identity. For example, according to Charles Taylor, to
have an identity is "to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about
what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance
for you and what is trivial and secondary."196 That is, to have an identity is to know
where one stands in relation to one's conception of the good. One's conception of the
good consists in those values, norms, commitments, and identifications that one
recognizes as most important, and it is in terms of this framework that one assesses the
significance of one's own and others' actions and experiences. The significance that one
ascribes to one's actions and experiences determines where one is located in relation to
the good.197
To develop a conception of the good and ascertain where one is situated in
relation to it, one must belong to a language community, for, as Taylor states "We first
learn our languages of moral and spiritual discernment by being brought into an ongoing
conversation by those who bring us up."198 In other words, it is by interacting with other
members of the communities to which one belongs that one acquires the language and
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reasoning skills required to interpret one's own and other's behaviour. One develops
these skills by comparing how one uses concepts with how they are used by others, and
by noting how others respond to one's application of them. In this way one can determine
whether or not one is using terms to convey the same meanings as other community
members. Thus, "We are inducted into language by being brought to see things as our
tutors do."199 Through social interaction shared systems of meaning are constructed, and
it is in terms of these shared understandings that one first learns to interpret one's actions
and experiences. Once one has learned the language of one's community, one can reflect
upon, question, and reinterpret it. However, "innovation can only take place from the
base in our common language."200 Hence, Taylor argues that one cannot be solely
responsible for one's identity because the creation and understanding of one's identity
depends on language and one acquires language through interaction with significant
others. As he writes, "one cannot be a self on one's own. I am a self only in relation to
certain interlocutors."201 In other words, personal identity is "dialogical." Taylor
maintains that, "We define our identity always in dialogue with, and sometimes in
struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us."202 The construction
of one's identity, and thus one's selfhood, requires that one be recognized by, and
negotiate with, other members of one's community.
Similarly, Seyla Benhabib contends that, "We are born into webs of interlocution
or into webs of narrative - from the familial and gender narratives to the linguistic one to
the macronarrative of one's collective identity. We become who we are by learning to be
199
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a conversation partner in these narratives."203 Once one has learned the narratives of
one's community, one can use those narratives, those values, norms, commitments, and
identifications, to construct a narrative of one's own. One's identity consists in the
narrative that one creates when one interprets one's actions and experiences in
accordance with the language one has acquired from one's significant others. As
Benhabib explains, "Although we do not choose the webs in whose nets we are initially
caught or select those with whom we wish to converse, our agency consists in our
capacity to weave out of those narratives and fragments of narratives a life story that
makes sense for us, as unique individual selves."204 Inter subjective communication
provides one with the language and reasoning skills required to create one's own identityconstituting narrative and to contribute to the ongoing development of what Benhabib
refers to as "master narratives," the shared systems of meaning in terms of which one
interprets one's own and others' actions and experiences.
Like Taylor and Benhabib, Alasdair Maclntyre maintains that one acquires an
understanding of the values, norms, commitments, and identifications in terms of which
one interprets one's actions and experiences from other members of one's community.206
Moreover, since we are born into certain social roles and relationships, at least some of
the values, norms, commitments and identifications that one recognizes as one's own are,
at least initially, ascribed by others. That is, "We enter human society.. .with one or more
imputed characters - roles into which we have been drafted - and we have to learn what
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they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our
responses to them are apt to be construed."207 Since one is not solely responsible for the
interpretive framework in terms of which one interprets one's actions and experiences
and thereby constructs one's narrative, Maclntyre maintains that, "we are never more
(and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives."208
Although narrative identity theorists tend to focus on the dialogical nature of
personal identity, the accounts of Taylor, Benhabib, and Maclntyre imply that personal
identities are only dialogical to the extent that collective identities are dialogical. Taylor,
Benhabib, and Maclntyre agree that personal identities are dialogical insofar as the
values, norms, commitments, and identifications that constitute the interpretive
framework in terms of which one assesses the meaning of one's actions and experiences
are initially acquired from, and subsequently negotiated with, one's significant others. In
other words, it is through dialogue with one's significant others about the collective
identities (the master narratives) that one endorses that one constructs and negotiates
one's personal identity.
The idea that collective identity is dialogical is explored in relation to feminist
solidarity by Jodi Dean and Allison Weir. Dean suggests that there are three ways in
which solidarity may be achieved. Conventional solidarity obtains among individuals
who have common interests and values, such as members of religious communities or
political parties. Individuals who participate in this kind of relationship are expected to
behave in accordance with the beliefs and objectives that they share. It is on the basis of
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their adherence to the norms, expectations, and practices of the group that individuals are
identified as group members.209
Affectional solidarity is what obtains among individuals who share feelings of
mutual care and concern, such as individuals involved in intimate relationships.
Individuals who participate in this kind of relationship are expected to recognize and
respond to the particular needs and interests of the other. It is with particular others that
participants feel united. Thus, whereas conventional solidarity is founded on recognition
of the other as the same and, therefore, interchangeable, affectional solidarity is founded
on recognition of the other as unique and, therefore, irreplaceable.210
Dean argues that the kinds of relationships that can be explained in terms of
affectional or conventional solidarity are limited.211 While affectional solidarity may
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members of different kinds of social groups. This is a departure from the other theories of
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Gilbert and Searle) the theories that have been examined have distinguished between
voluntary and non-voluntary groups, and May has noted differences between organized
and unorganized groups, unlike Dean these other theorists have also implied that one
high-level explanation can account for the unity that obtains among members of social
groups of all kinds. In other words, they have suggested that there is one conception of
social grouphood that applies to all social groups. In the chapters that follow, I will
likewise suggest that there is a conception of social grouphood that is, at a high level,
applicable to all social groups. This approach is motivated by a desire to clearly articulate
what grounds out tendency to identify certain collections of individuals as social groups
and treat them as such. As Gilbert points out, it is not the case that all collections of
individuals are perceived and treated as collectives. For example, we are unlikely to
ascribe collective action, intentionality or responsibility to a collection of individuals
standing at a street corner waiting for the light to change. What accounts for the different
levels of significance that we assign to individuals standing at a street corner and families
or women? It seems to be at this point of departure between collections and groups that
questions of collective action, intentionality and responsibility arise. It is unlikely that
collective action, intentionality and responsibility will be ascribed to a collection, but we
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account for personal relationships, such as friendship, it is unable to explain relationships
among individuals who do not feel mutual care and concern.212 Moreover, although
conventional solidarity is able to account for relationships among individuals who do not
feel mutual care and concern, this is accomplished by emphasizing their similarities and
ignoring their differences. Participants are recognized, not as individuals with different
experiences and perspectives, but rather as adherents to the social norms, expectations,
and practices that define the group.213
However, Dean suggests that there is a third way in which solidarity may be
achieved. She argues that, instead of shared feelings, values, or interests, reflective
solidarity may be founded on difference.214 Individuals belong to multiple social groups
and are, therefore, subject to multiple, perhaps conflicting, norms, expectations, and
practices. These multiple identities amount to multiple interpretive frameworks from
which individuals may accept, reject, or renegotiate their other identities.215 Since there
are differences among the interpretative frameworks of group members, they may have
different ideas about what it means to be a group member. As Dean states, "We can never
'be' an identity... Instead, we adopt an interpretation of it, an interpretation which arises
out of our understanding of identity in the context of the relationships in which we are
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situated."216 As a consequence of these different ideas about what it means to be a group
member, the norms, expectations, and practices that define the group are in a constant
state of flux as members consider and critique one another's positions.217
Unlike Medina, Mathiesen and Carr, Dean argues that differences among the
perspectives of group members need not threaten the unity of the group. As Dean states,
"We can identify with or as a group without having to fix this identity in a set of pregiven
assumptions."218 She suggests that negotiation of the meaning of given identities may
unite individuals. According to Dean, "a 'we' is constituted through the communicative
efforts of different Ts'." 2 1 9 That is, reflective solidarity is achieved through dialogue,
through negotiation about what it means to be a member of the group. As she states,
"Through language we establish a relationship, creating a common, social space. With
our 'queries' we challenge each other, letting our space, for a time, be one of
negotiation."220 To dialogue with the other is to recognize, respect, and engage with the
perspective of the other. It is to create a relationship, a 'we', in which the perspectives of
all participants are heard, considered, and critiqued.
Allison Weir makes a similar claim in "Global Feminism and Transformative
Identity Politics." She argues that a successful conception of collective identity requires
"a shift from a focus on identity as category to a focus on identification-with."221 An
understanding of identity as category suggests that identities are merely given and
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individuals share an identity or belong to the same category to the extent that they satisfy
given membership criteria, that is, to the extent that they are the same.222 An
understanding of identity as identification-with suggests that identities are both given and
constructed. Although there are categories into which we are born or assigned by others,
what it means to belong to these categories is always in the process of being redefined
and renegotiated.
Like Dean, Weir maintains that this ongoing process of creating meaning is what
accounts for solidarity. The meanings that individuals ascribe to given categories are
determined by the values, identities, and relationships with which they identify. It is
inevitable that there will be differences, possibly conflicts, among the interpretive
frameworks to which individuals are committed. These differences do not, however,
preclude the possibility of solidarity.223 Weir suggests that solidarity requires "learning
about her world, learning to take her perspective, and thus forever changing my own."224
That is, solidarity requires engagement with and knowledge of the other. Through this
process a 'we' is created, a 'we' that accommodates and respects difference.
Weir refers to this kind of identification with the other as transformative
identification. Engaging with and getting to know the perspective of the other changes
one's relationship with the other and thereby changes both oneself and the other. She
states, "When I identify with you, I am reconstituting myself, my identity, through
traveling to your world: through coming to know you, by listening to, witnessing your
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experience, I am expanding my self to include my relation to you."225 Through dialogue a
new identity, a new 'we', is created, and this new identity informs, and thus transforms,
the self-conceptions of all participants.
According to Dean and Weir, dialogue is a means of achieving an identity that
does not ignore difference. Engagement with the other creates an opportunity for the
perspectives of all participants to be voiced, understood, and critiqued. However, Weir
contends that, for this opportunity to be realized, the power divides that exist among
members of the collective must be acknowledged and traversed. Weir argues that
individuals who participate in the creation of a communicative 'we' are interconnected
not only by relations of identification, but also by relations of power. As a consequence
of identities that they do not share, some group members will enjoy privileges or be
subject to constraints not experienced by other members. Thus, individuals who
participate in the dialogue about what it means to be a member of a collective may differ
both in their perspectives and in their ability to have their perspectives heard. The
experiences or perspectives of some participants may not be recognized.226
According to Taylor, nonrecognition or misrecognition can be harmful, for it can
result in a situation in which potentially degrading interpretations of one's actions and
experiences endorsed by others silence or inform one's self-conception.227 However,
Carolin Emcke contends that all personal and collective identities are shaped by both
recognition and misrecognition. That is, one's self-conception is likely to be recognized
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and respected by some of one's significant others and ignored by others.228 She claims
that misrecognition becomes harmful in the manner described by Taylor when those who
are unwilling to consider one's self-conception occupy positions of power such that one's
perspective is silenced and only the perspective of the other is heard.229
Given the inevitability of power divides among group members and the potential
of nonrecognition or misrecognition to silence less powerful members of the collective,
Weir concludes that creation of an inclusive 'we', a 'we' that reflects the perspectives of
all members, requires "identifications across power divides."230 As she states, "we can
understand a global unity or identity not through some kind of immediate, given shared
humanity or shared feeling, but through understanding our relationships in webs of
power."231
However, Weir maintains that identification with the other is not the only kind of
identification that solidarity requires. She argues that creation of a communicative 'we'
also requires that each participant possess "an orientation to solidarity, a commitment to
and identification with a 'we'."232 That is, solidarity requires that individuals not only
engage with one another and participate in the dialogue about what it means to be a
member of the collective, but also that they identify with the collective identity that
emerges from that dialogical process. Thus, for Weir solidarity requires dialogue
(identification with the other across power divides) and identification with the collective.
There are striking similarities between the accounts of solidarity proposed by
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Dean and Weir and narrative conceptions of the self. Like Dean and Weir, narrative
identity theorists suggest that identities emerge from dialogues or narratives that include
multiple, possibly conflicting, interpretations of events and experiences. According to
narrative accounts of personal identity, one's personal identity consists in the character or
subject that is revealed by a narrative that attempts to organize and reconcile multiple
interpretations of the events and experiences of one's life. They claim that the subject of a
dialogue or narrative is the 'who' implied in the events and experiences recounted in and
organized by the narrative. As Maclntyre explains, "The self inhabits a character whose
unity is given as the unity of a character.. .1 am what I may justifiably be taken by others
to be in the course of living out a story that runs from my birth to my death; I am the
subject of a history that is my own and no one else's, that has its own peculiar
meaning."233 He contends that "personal identity is just that identity presupposed by the
unity of the character which the unity of a narrative requires. Without such unity there
would not be subjects of whom stories could be told."234 Similarly, according to Kim
Atkins, the subject of the narrative of one's life is what one identifies as one's self and
with which one is identified by others. As she states,
I come to understand myself (and likewise, others understand who I am) as the
subject of a certain life, for example, as someone who was born at a specific date
and place into a certain family; who has lived at certain places in certain ways;
who has particular physical and character traits, weakness and abilities, hopes and
fears; who has acted and suffered in certain ways; and who enjoys or is denied
certain social and political status.235
Just as Weir claims that solidarity requires more than construction of an inclusive
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collective identity, Atkins suggests that achievement of a unified self involves more than
construction of a unified narrative. Atkins argues that one must also identify with the
subject of one's narrative. Indeed, she contends that "who I am is something that I must
attest to."236 Similarly, Carr maintains that to constitute a social group individuals must
accept a narrative that identifies them as a collective. He states that, "It is their
acceptance that makes them members, constitutes their recognition of the others as fellow
members, and determines their participation in the action, experience, and life of the
community."237 Thus, whereas the unity of one's self requires that one identify with the
subject of the narrative of one's life, the unity of a social group requires that group
r

members identify with the plural subject of the dialogue or narrative that articulates the
history of the collective.
Like Medina, Mathiesen and Carr, Dean and Weir suggest that social grouphood
is achieved when individuals share an understanding of themselves as a group members.
However, according to Dean and Weir, this kind of shared understanding does not require
sameness among the properties, circumstances or interpretive frameworks of individual
members. They contend that new or redefined identities may emerge from ongoing
consideration, critique, and negotiation of multiple, possibly conflicting, understandings
of what group membership entails. Through dialogue identities that reflect, and perhaps
reconcile, multiple perspectives may be created, and, according to Weir, when
individuals identify with these identities social unity may be achieved. Individuals share
an understanding of themselves as group members if they identify with the plural subject
that emerges from the dialogue about what group membership entails. These individuals
236
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need not possess the same understanding of what it means to be a group member because
the plural subject with which they identify is the product of an ongoing dialogue that can
accommodate multiple interpretations. Thus, social unity requires both identification with
the other and identification with a plural subject that is revealed through dialogue.
Unlike the theories of Searle, Gilbert, May and Cudd, this dialogical
understanding of social unity can account for social groups in which sameness does not
obtain. Consider, for example, a family of two parents and two adopted children, none
whom are biologically related. Even without biological ties, these individuals perceive
themselves as a family because through dialogue they have negotiated and endorsed an
understanding of what it means to be a member of that family. One can imagine that,
even if the family members in this example were biologically connected, the family
would fall apart if they were unwilling to engage with one another and identify
themselves as family members.
However, it should be emphasized that, according to narrative identity theorists,
dialogues or narratives and the subjects that they reveal are unstable. Indeed, since our
life stories change with each new experience, Ricoeur describes autobiographical
narrative composition as "unending work of interpretation applied to action and to
oneself."238 Similarly, Carr states that, "Life can be regarded as a constant effort, even a
struggle, to maintain or restore narrative coherence in the face of an ever-threatening,
impending chaos at all levels, from the smallest project to the overall 'coherence of
life'."239 Dean and Weir suggest that the same is true of social unity. They maintain that
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the plural subject with which group members identify is unstable since the dialogue from
which it emerges is ongoing. As Dean states, "because it is created through
communicative utterances, this 'we' cannot remain fixed. It is constantly recreated and
renewed by the 'query' as members confront and challenge, accept and reject, the claims
raised by each and all."240 Consequently, group members' identification with the plural
subject that emerges from dialogue must be continually affirmed. As Weir states,
"Communities and social movements can be sustained only through continual rebuilding
of relationships, rethinking of meanings and goals, and practices of identification with
each other, with a we, with some kind of meaning or significance (which can change over
time)."241 Thus, returning to the example of the family, to continue to exist as a family,
the family members must continue to dialogue with one another about what being a
member of that family entails and identify with the understanding of family that emerges
from that dialogue.
Moreover, the social group that is of particular interest to Dean and Weir is
voluntary insofar as it consists in individuals who identify with a collective identity.
However, they acknowledge the existence of non-voluntary social groups. Dean's
description of conventional solidarity is consistent with the understanding of nonvoluntary social grouphood proposed by Emcke. She characterizes the identities on the
basis of which conventional solidarity is achieved as "given" or "ascribed."242 Individuals
united in conventional solidarity do not identify with the 'we', but are instead identified
as members of the 'we'. Moreover, the identity with which they are identified is "defined
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behind the backs of members."243 The identity with which members of the collective are
associated assumes sameness and stability, and therefore is unable to account for, and
seeks to repress, the inevitable heterogeneity and instability of members' perspectives.244
Similarly, Weir describes a collective identity that ignores differences among the
perspectives of group members as "false" since it is "based on an agreement and a
sameness that do not in fact exist."245 However, she also acknowledges that collective
identities are not entirely subjective. Rather, collective identities are both given and
constructed, objective and subjective, categorical and dialogical.246 There are identities to
which individuals are assigned by others on the basis of assumed sameness, and through
ongoing dialogue these identities are continuously renegotiated and redefined.247
While communication across power divides may explain voluntary social groups,
it seems to me that a failure to communicate across power divides may explain nonvoluntary social groups. Dean and Weir agree that solidarity is achieved through the
renegotiation of given identities. Engagement with the other has the potential to achieve a
new identity that incorporates multiple interpretations of what it means to be a member of
the collective. However, as noted above, according to Weir, for this potential to be
actualized participants must acknowledge, and engage with one another across, power
divides. Otherwise, only those members of the collective who occupy positions of power
will be able to make themselves heard. In a situation in which power divides are not
traversed, individuals who occupy positions of power, and are, therefore, allowed to
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participate in the dialogue about what it means to be member of the collective, may
identify with the plural subject that emerges from it and assume that it also applies to
others, whereas individuals who are excluded from participation may have the identity
assigned to them even though they may not identify with it. Of course, individuals need
not participate in the dialogue to identify with the plural subject that it reveals. They may
endorse an identity that has been given to them by others, in which case their group
membership may be considered voluntary. However, Emcke would likely argue that their
memberships are less voluntary than the memberships of individuals who are allowed to
participate in the dialogue about what it means to be a group member. Moreover, group
membership would be considered non-voluntary for individuals who neither participate in
the dialogue about what group membership entails nor identify with the plural subject
that it produces. Thus, among members of the same group, membership may be voluntary
for some and non-voluntary for others.
Furthermore, group members are unlikely to be the only participants in a dialogue
about what group membership entails. Dean and Weir acknowledge that it is from our
significant others that we acquire our initial understandings of the values, commitments,
and identifications that constitute our interpretative frameworks. Moreover, according to
Carr, individuals may be categorized or "grouped" by external observers and thereby
constitute a group-object.248 Emcke contends that it is this kind of grouping, and
corresponding treatment of group members, by non-members that accounts for nonvoluntary social groups. Thus, a 'we' may also be experienced as a 'you' and a 'they'.
According to Atkins, "who a person is is the named subject of a practical and conceptual
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complex of first, second and third-person perspectives which structure and unify a life
grasped as it is lived."249 Similarly, the identity of a collective consists in a plural subject
that emerges from a dialogue in which first, second, and third-person perspectives are
voiced, considered, and critiqued.
The relations of power that exist among members of the collective also exist
between members and non-members. Non-members may be more privileged than
members and, consequently, may be more likely to have their perspectives reflected in a
dialogue about what group membership entails. This possibility seems to be recognized
by Dean, for she suggests that through reflective solidarity group members may acquire
sufficient strength to resist identities based on nonrecognition or misrecognition. As she
states, "we call on another to stand by us over and against an 'other' who seeks to oppress
us or who fails to recognize and include us.. .we are connected through our struggle
against those who threaten, denigrate, and silence us."250
When non-members enjoy greater privileges than group members and are
unwilling to engage with group members, then the identities with which group members
are associated by non-members may not be identities with which they identify. It is
possible that group members will endorse identities that have been constructed by nonmembers, in which case their memberships may be considered voluntary. However, as
suggested above, Emcke would likely contend that their memberships are less voluntary
than the memberships of individuals who are committed to identities that they helped to
create. Moreover, when group members do not identify with identities defined and
assigned by non-members, then their memberships may be considered non-voluntary. In
249
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the same way that a failure on the part of powerful group members to engage with less
powerful members may account for non-voluntary group membership, a failure on the
part of powerful non-members to engage with less powerful members may account for
non-voluntary group membership.
Thus, non-voluntary social grouphood obtains when individuals are associated
with an identity 1) that emerges from a dialogue about what it means to be a group
member from which they are excluded, and 2) with which they do not identify. Although
members of non-voluntary social groups do not identify with their given identity, they
are, nevertheless, unified. Whereas members of a voluntary social group become a 'we'
by identifying with the plural subject that is revealed by a dialogue about what group
membership entails, members of a non-voluntary social group become a 'they' when they
are identified by others as the plural subject of the dialogue.
The accounts of collective identity described by Medina, Mathiesen, Carr, Dean
and Weir suggest a way in which May's conception of social grouphood may be modified
to avoid at least some of the charges of anti-essentialist scholars. The theories of Medina,
Mathiesen and Carr indicate that individuals need not possess the same properties, as
May claims, to share an understanding themselves as group members. Moreover, the
dialogical conceptions of solidarity proposed by Dean and Weir imply that sameness
among the interpretive frameworks of individuals need not obtain for them to share an
understanding of themselves as group members. Rather, individuals can come to share an
understanding of themselves as group members when they engage with one another about
what group membership entails and identify with the plural subject of the dialogue.
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However, while these modifications to May's theory may allow him to escape the
problem of sameness, they do not resolve other potential difficulties.

VIII - Interrelated Individuals and Collective Agency
May contends that it is appropriate to ascribe action to a collective when the
action is motivated by intentions that emerge from the relationships that obtain among the
members of the collective. Collective action can be fully explained in terms of
individuals and the relations in which they stand. There is no need to posit the existence
of social groups as distinct entities with unique causal powers. However, Dave ElderVass argues that the notion that social groups are nothing more than interrelated
individuals has absurd implications. He claims that the idea that it is not the social group
but rather its individual members and their relationships that account for collective action
is analogous to the notion it is not the dog itself but rather the parts of a dog and their
relations that explain its ability to bark. According to Elder-Vass, it implies that
when a dog barks, this is not because the dog has the causal power to bark, but
rather because its lungs, windpipe, vocal chords, mouth, etc, and the relations
between them have the power to bark. And if this is not absurd enough.. .we must
also deny that it is the lungs, windpipe, etc, that are doing the barking, but rather
the 'cells plus relations' that make those organs up, and then we must consider it
to be the 'molecules plus relations' instead of the cells, the 'atoms plus relations'
instead of the molecules, and so on to levels where science has so far failed to
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goHowever, the analogy only works if, like Elder-Vass, one assumes that a social
group is a material object with parts that, when arranged in a particular way, constitute a
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whole with unique causal powers. May insists that social groups are merely concepts that
refer to interrelated individuals. Social groups as concepts do not have parts.
Still, Elder-Vass may be correct to assert that individuals and their relationships
are insufficient to adequately account for collective action. According to May, what
distinguishes individual action from collective action are social relations. Social relations
shape the actions and mental states of individuals such that they can engage in activities
that they could not perform otherwise. However, if, as feminist and cultural scholars
suggest, individuals are inextricably embedded in webs of relations and these social
relations influence the actions and mental states of individuals insofar as they influence
their interpretative frameworks, then, following May's definition of collective action, it
seems that all action is collective action. To be fair, May contends that, in the case of
unorganized collectives at least, it is the relationship of solidarity in particular that
explains their capacity for collective action. Yet, this does not change the fact that there
may be many different collectives with whom individuals may be united in solidarity, and
this solidarity may manifest itself in the norms, expectations, and practices that
individuals endorse (either reflectively or pre-reflectively) and in accordance with which
they interpret their own and others' actions and experiences.
Whereas May claims that solidarity is required for collective action, others
suggest that social relations, like solidarity, are required for any kind of action. Seyla
Benhabib describes human beings as "finite, embodied and fragile creatures." She claims
that, "The human infant becomes a 'self,' a being capable of speech and action, only by
learning to interact in a human community."252 Similarly, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that
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human beings "come into being in a social context that is literally constitutive of us.
Some of our most essential characteristics, such as our capacity for language and the
conceptual framework through which we see the world, are not made by us, but given to
us (or developed in us) through our interactions with others."253 According to Anthony
King, shared systems of meaning are required for individual agency.
In order to act, individuals rely on the co-operation of others. Others must respond
predictably, in line with the individual's intentions; they must understand what the
individual is trying to do. Consequently, in order to enjoy individual agency,
humans must act in a manner which is consistent with the understandings and
interests of their group. They must act in a way which encourages others to cooperate. To have social agency, it is necessary not to act as an individual but, on
the contrary, to act as a member of a social group. It is necessary to act in
deference to one's social relations.254
Thus, unless one is willing to accept the notion that all action is collective action, it
appears that a conception of social grouphood as individuals and the relations in which
they stand is insufficient to account for collective action.
However, May anticipates this criticism. He argues that it fails to take into
account the fact that "it is quite common to describe some human acts by reference to the
causal history of one solitary human being."255 Yet, what Benhabib, Nedelsky and King
seem to be suggesting is that all action is shaped or conditioned, rather than caused by,
our significant others. This is consistent with the notion that a state of affairs may be
caused by the actions of one individual. The individual is the cause and the social
relations in which he or she is embedded are the conditions. Thus, May's response is
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insufficient. His theory of social grouphood may explain the social nature of individual
action, but it does not explain collective action.

IX - Conclusion
Larry May's conception of social grouphood as interrelated individuals enjoys
greater success than the theories of Searle and Gilbert considered in Chapter One insofar
as it is able to account for non-voluntary social groups. However, like the accounts of
Searle and Gilbert, May's proposal is vulnerable to challenges from feminist and cultural
scholars who object to the idea that social grouphood requires sameness among the
properties of individual members. I have suggested that these charges can be avoided by
modifying May's theory in accordance with the dialogical conceptions of collective
identity proposed by Dean and Weir. Like Medina, Mathiesen and Carr, Dean and Weir
suggest that social groups consist in individuals who share an understanding of
themselves as group members. Moreover, Dean and Weir suggest that this can be
achieved without sameness among the properties of individuals. They contend that
solidarity may be achieved when individuals engage in dialogue with one another and
identify with the plural subject that is the product of their interaction.
While these modifications may enable May to explain the social nature of
individual action, it remains the case that a conception of social groups as interrelated
individuals is unable to account for collective action to the extent that it is unable to
differentiate between individual action and collective action. Perhaps tenable theories of
collective action and moral responsibility require a more robust understanding of social
groups. This possibility will be explored in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter Three: Realism, Social Grouphood and Collective Agency
I - Introduction
The theories discussed in Chapters One and Two suggest that it is appropriate to
ascribe collective intentionality to social groups. Indeed, Searle and Gilbert argue that
collective intentionality is a condition of social grouphood. They maintain that collective
intentionality is achieved when a collection of individuals shares a we-intention, an
intention to do something as a group. May agrees with Searle and Gilbert that collective
intentionality obtains when a collection of individuals share an intention. However, May
contends that social grouphood is a condition of collective intentionality. The intentions
that members of a collective share emerge from the group-constituting relations in which
they stand. Collectives may be held morally responsible for the actions that are motivated
by shared intentions, for the actions cannot be fully explained in terms of individual
action.
Paul Sheehy does not challenge the claim that collective intentionality consists in
shared intentions. However, as discussed in the Introduction, he questions the idea that
collective intentionality is a condition of collective moral responsibility. Sheehy argues
that, while it may be possible for members of small, simple groups to share intentions,
shared intentions are unlikely to be found among all members of large, complex social
groups. As a consequence of the multiple practices and structures that shape their
relations, it is likely to be difficult to establish direct connections between the intentions
and actions of members of large, complex social groups and the states of affairs for which
the groups may be held morally responsible. Therefore, to justify ascriptions of collective
moral responsibility one must either find a way to demonstrate that shared intentions
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exist among members of large, complex social groups or find alternative grounds for such
ascriptions.256 Sheehy pursues the second option. He argues that a social group may be
held morally responsible for its practices and values if it is capable of deliberation and
reflection. Whether or not a social group has the capacity for collective reflection and
deliberation depends upon the group-constituting relations in which it consists.257 Like
May, Sheehy contends that a social group consists in a collection of interrelated
individuals. However, whereas May claims that social groups are merely concepts that
refer to individuals and their relationships, Sheehy maintains that social groups are
distinct entities with unique causal powers. Indeed, he defines a social group as a
collection of individuals who are interrelated such that they constitute an integrated
whole with unique causal powers. Moreover, contrary to Searle and Gilbert, Sheehy
argues that shared intentions are only one of many kinds of relations on the basis of
which social grouphood may be established.258
I will argue that, although Sheehy's interrelational holism is able to avoid some of
the difficulties encountered by the theories of Searle, Gilbert and May, it is problematic
insofar as it is unable to account for non-voluntary social groups as defined by Emcke. I
will contend that Sheehy's theory faces this problem because he does not recognize that
the causal powers of a social group are mediated by, and thereby depend upon, the
perspectives of individuals, both members and non-members. A similar conception of
social grouphood that does not suffer this shortcoming will be considered. However, as I
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will demonstrate, when the influence of individuals on the causal powers of social groups
is taken into account, the possibility of collective action is called into question.

II - Sheehy's Theory of Social Grouphood
Searle, Gilbert and May argue that individuals must share an understanding of
themselves as group members to constitute a social group. Paul Sheehy contends,
however, that, while it may be the case that in some, possibly many, situations group
members perceive themselves as such, this kind of self-conception among group
members is not a necessary feature of social groups. Instead, he maintains that a
collection of individuals who do not recognize themselves as group members may,
nevertheless, constitute a social group if certain kinds of relations obtain among them.259
To illustrate, Sheehy uses the example of four egoistic prisoners who happen to
attempt an escape at the same time. Their only means of escape is a large rowboat on a
riverbank that all four discover simultaneously. Due to the size of the boat, the rowing
efforts of all four individuals are required to move it through the water. Even though they
recognize that they must collaborate to achieve their goal of escaping, the four
individuals do not recognize one another as group members. They happen to have in
common an intention to escape from prison, but the four individuals do not share an
intention to escape from prison as a group?60 That is, the escapees share an I-intention,
but not a we-intention. Sheehy believes, nevertheless, that the four escapees constitute a
social group. "Motivated by the purely selfish desire for flight, the processes and
interrelatedness of the rowing unites the individuals into a unit, independently of their
259
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beliefs and attitudes about the others."261 While the four escapees row the boat they
constitute a social group because they are interrelated insofar as the actions of each
escapee are shaped by the actions of the other three. As Sheehy states, "the rowing of
each is affected or constrained by the collective rowing, and the production of the overall
state of the boat."262
Sheehy maintains that social groups consist in collections of individuals whose
beliefs, attitudes, or activities are "mutually affecting."263 He does not deny the
possibility that some social groups consist in sets of individuals who share certain mental
states, as Searle and Gilbert suggest. However, Sheehy contends that their social group
status is determined by the relations that obtain among the mental states of group
members, and not by the mental states themselves. As he states, "a group is formed
through the ways in which individuals interrelate and interact, and group-constituting
patterns of relations are not necessarily those in which the kinds of beliefs essential to the
intentionalist thesis will feature."264 Moreover, contrary to Searle, Gilbert and May,
Sheehy maintains that sameness and solidarity are not the only kinds of relations on the
basis of which social grouphood may be established.265 Sameness and solidarity are only
two of "a potentially indefinitely wide array" of group-constituting relations.266 There
are different kinds of group-constituting relations because there are different kinds of
groups. According to Sheehy, "Nuclear families, work teams, gangs, mobs, tribes and
peoples are all groups, and they are formed through relations which vary in form, content
261
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and complexity."267 Furthermore, it need not be the case that the same relationship
obtains among all members of a social group. Instead, a social group may consist in a
complex "web of relations."268
From these group-constituting relations social norms, expectations, and practices
emerge, which, in turn, shape the beliefs, attitudes, and activities of group members.269
Group-constituting relations also give rise to properties whose influence extends beyond
group members. For example, the cooperative actions of the four escapees give them the
power to move the rowboat through the water. Likewise, the joint actions that transform a
collection of individuals into a mob also give them the power to cause destruction.270
Thus, social groups have causal properties and powers. The relations in which group
members stand give rise to properties that exert a causal influence on social events, on
social norms, expectations and practices, and, thereby, on individuals' beliefs, attitudes,
and activities.271
Sheehy insists that the causal properties of social groups are irreducible insofar as
they cannot be fully explained in terms of the properties of individuals. The causal
properties of a social group are a consequence of its members standing in certain
relations, and may disappear if those relations change. Just as a table is able to bear
weight when its parts stand in certain relations, a social group is able to effect change
when its members stand in certain relations. As he states, "it is the units held together (as
a whole) which possess or instantiate or give rise to the property.. .Alter the relations of
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the parts in certain ways and certain of the properties fall from view."

The causal

properties possessed by social groups only emerge when group-constituting relations
obtain.
Sheehy contends that, if the causal properties of social groups are irreducible, then
it cannot be the case, as Searle suggests, that social phenomena over which social groups
exert a causal influence can be fully explained in terms of the actions and mental states of
individuals. Adequate explanations of phenomena over which social groups exert a causal
influence must include references to social groups. Sheehy does not deny that
explanations of social phenomena in terms of individual facts can be given. He claims,
however, that reductionist explanations are not as informative as explanations that also
feature social facts.

For example, it may be possible to explain a riot without referring

to the mob, that is, in terms of "an aggregate serial ordering and intermeshing of
individual acts and intentional states."274 Sheehy argues, however, that a reductionist
explanation of the riot is unlikely to "furnish an understanding of at least the same order
as the explanation featuring the group."275 The information that a reductionist account of
the riot yields is unlikely to include the kind of information being sought. Explanations
that refer only to the activities of individuals are of a different kind than explanations that
also refer to social groups. Thus, he concludes that "reference to groups is ineliminable or
indispensable from our descriptions and explanations of the social world."276
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Moreover, if social groups have causal properties that are not reducible to the
properties of individuals, Sheehy contends that it cannot be the case, as Gilbert and May
suggest, that social groups supervene upon their individual members. As discussed in
Chapter One, Sheehy claims that supervenience implies an asymmetrical dependence
relation.277 So, if a social group supervenes upon its individual members, then facts about
the group co-vary with, and are determined by, facts about its individual members. That
is, social groups possess properties that are determined by, but not reducible to, the
properties of their members. The properties possessed by the group give the group
powers that are not held by its individual members. If the group has causal powers such
that it can produce change at the social level, then supervenience requires a
corresponding change at the individual level. However, if the group is the cause of the
change at the group level, and if the causal powers of the group are not reducible to the
causal powers of its individual members, then, according to Sheehy, the group is the
cause of the corresponding change at the individual level. And if the group can cause
changes at the individual level, then it seems that the dependence relation between the
group and its members is not asymmetrical. Facts about individual members may be
determined by facts about the group. Thus, Sheehy concludes that, like reductionism, the
supervenience thesis is false.278 He does not deny that social groups depend upon their
individual members. Rather, Sheehy contends that social groups and their members are
mutually dependent. As he states, "the relationship between individual and group is a
two-way one: each influences the other."279
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To have such a profound influence on the world, Sheehy claims that social groups
must be material objects. He states that, "If groups were non-material entities, then it
seems thoroughly mysterious how groups as such could stand in the appropriate kind of
relations with other kinds of things to exert the influence indicated by their role in
explanation."280 Sheehy defines a material object as "an individual entity with a unity of
form and causal capacity through which it can be individuated and located in terms of its
spatio-temporal coordinates."281 He admits that, in some cases, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to observe social groups as a consequence of the fact that membership is
subject to change and members may be widely dispersed. Sheehy insists, however, that
"knowledge of an object is not limited to its being observed."282 Social groups can also be
individuated on the basis of the impact that they have on the world. Moreover, the
inability of human beings to observe large, fluid, widely dispersed objects does not mean
that they do not exist. As he states, "the perceptual capacity of a kind of creature does not
determine the objects there are in the world."283 Sheehy also argues that it is not
necessary to observe an object in its entirety to identify it as one. He offers the example
of being able to identify an object from a distance as a tower block even though all he is
able to see from that distance is part of a building.284 It may be possible to individuate a
large, scattered social group on the basis of one's experience of part of it. Thus, the fact
that some social groups cannot be directly perceived does not preclude the possibility that
they are material objects. Like other complex material objects, "such as houses and
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dogs," social groups consist in parts that are related to one another in such a way that they
constitute integrated wholes with causal powers.285 What differentiates social groups
from other complex material objects is that social groups are constituted by parts that
have minds.286 Social groups consist in interrelated mental entities.
Although social groups depend upon mental entities, Sheehy insists that they are
ontologically objective.287 That is, social groups exist "prior to our conceptualisation of
them."288 Regardless of whether it is perceived by human beings, a social group exists if
group-constituting relations obtain among a collection of individuals from which causal
powers emerge.289 Thus, the term 'social group' refers to a natural kind, "a real
distinction in nature."290
What is, at least partly, subjective is the identification of social groups. As Sheehy
states, "A mind-independent world determines what there is, but not (entirely) how we
conceptualise or order it."291 Groups are identified on the basis of their explanatory role.
One social group may have numerous effects on the world and therefore explain a variety
of social phenomena. Hence, there are multiple ways in which a social group may be
identified. We may have different experiences of, and consequently have different ways
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of individuating, the same social group.

A group member's experience of the group is

likely to be quite different from that of a non-member, for example. Likewise, an
anthropologist's experience of a social group may be quite different from that of a
sociologist or epidemiologist. Consequently, a group member, anthropologist,
sociologist, and epidemiologist may appeal to different properties to identify the same
social group. Sheehy insists, however, that the individuation of social groups is not "just
a question of conventionalism."293 The identity of a social group is also determined by
the way things are in fact, by the relations that in fact obtain among group members and
the causal properties and powers that emerge from them. Still, he argues that '"how
things are' is amenable to a number of different cuts," and how it is cut depends, in part,
upon one's perspective and interests.294 Thus, although the existence of social groups is
objective, the identification of social groups is at least partly subjective.

Ill - Challenges to Sheehy's Theory of Social Grouphood
As discussed in Chapter One, the theories of social grouphood proposed by Searle
and Gilbert are unable to account for non-voluntary social groups because the ontological
individualism to which they are committed implies that social grouphood requires a kind
of voluntariness. It suggests that individuals must indicate a willingness to become
members to constitute a social group. However, Sheehy denies this assertion. While it
may be the case that a collection of individuals constitutes a social group because they
are interrelated insofar as they share a willingness to become group members, this is not
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the only kind of interrelation on the basis of which social grouphood may be established.
Moreover, he claims that even if individuals are unwilling to become group members,
they nevertheless constitute a social group if their beliefs, attitudes, or actions are
interrelated in a manner that gives rise to causal properties and powers. Thus,
voluntariness is not a necessary condition of social grouphood.
Although Sheehy rejects the notion that social grouphood requires voluntariness,
there is reason to believe that he would not accept the conception of non-voluntary social
groups proposed by Carolin Emcke. Sheehy contends that social groups are ontologically
objective, that is, they do not depend upon the mental states of individuals for their
existence. Conversely, Emcke suggests that non-voluntary social groups are ontologically
subjective. She defines a non-voluntary social group as a collection of individuals upon
whom an identity, and the social norms, expectations, and practices that it entails, has
been imposed. The relations in which non-voluntary group members stand are not
sufficient to explain their social group status. Their status as a social group is determined,
at least in part, by how they are perceived by non-members. If, contrary to their selfconceptions, individuals are perceived by non-members as group members, then they will
be treated by non-members as such. That is, non-members will treat non-voluntary group
members in accordance with the social norms, expectations, and practices that they
associate with group membership.
How non-voluntary group members are treated by non-members influences
members' beliefs, attitudes, and actions. To explain this process Emcke refers to Ian
Hacking's looping effect. According to Hacking, if an identity is associated with
favourable treatment by others, one may develop a heightened sense of self-worth and
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change one's behaviour in an attempt to reinforce the identity. On the other hand, if the
identity is associated with unfavourable treatment by others, one's sense of self-worth
may be diminished and one may change one's behaviour in an attempt to distance oneself
from, or redefine, the identity. A third possibility is that one may not care about how one
is perceived by others. Even in this case, however, one's self-conception and behaviour
will be influenced by others, since the social rules, expectations, and practices associated
with the assigned identity may restrict possible courses of action. Hacking argues that
these behavioural changes that are produced by collective identities produce changes in
the identities themselves. Specifically, the behavioural changes cause people to
reconsider, and perhaps revise, the social rules, expectations, and practices associated
with the identities. Changes in the social rules, expectations, and practices associated
with the identities that are ascribed to individuals by others, in turn, produce changes in
the self-conceptions and behaviour of the individuals. Hacking refers to this process of
change as a "looping effect."295
Hacking's looping effect implies two things. First, it suggests that the power of at
least some social groups to influence the conduct of their members is determined in part
by the perceptions of non-members. The way in which non-members define a social
group (the social norms, expectations, and practices that they associate with group
membership) influences the actions and opportunities of group members and thereby
shapes their self-conceptions. Second, Hacking's looping effect suggests that the beliefs,
actions, and attitudes of group members and non-members are interrelated. Group
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members may change their behaviour in response to the manner in which they are treated
by non-members, and any changes in the conduct of group members may encourage nonmembers to revise the social norms, expectations, and practices that they associate with
group membership.
These two implications suggest two possible ways in which the perceptions of
non-members may influence the causal powers of non-voluntary social groups. The
causal powers and properties of non-voluntary social groups may depend upon the
perceptions of non-members, in which case non-voluntary social groups are ontologically
subjective, as Emcke claims. Alternatively, the causal powers and properties of nonvoluntary social groups may emerge from the relations that obtain among both members
and non-members. It is possible that both options are true. It is unlikely, however, that
Sheehy would accept either one.
Sheehy defines a social group as a collection of individuals whose interrelated
beliefs, attitudes, and/or actions give rise to causal properties and powers. If the beliefs,
attitudes, and actions of members and non-members of non-voluntary social groups are
interrelated, as Hacking suggests, and give rise to causal properties and powers, then,
according to Sheehy's theory, members and non-members must belong to the same social
group. However, by definition non-members are not members of a social group. Thus,
this is not a viable alternative for Sheehy. Although he does not provide justification for
his assertion that only the relations that obtain among group members are able to sustain
the kind of causal powers and properties that account for social phenomena, Sheehy must
insist on this if his conception of social grouphood is to suffice as a means of
differentiating between social groups and other kinds of social entities.

112

The notion that at least some of the causal powers and properties of some social
groups depend upon the perceptions of non-members is also incompatible with Sheehy's
interrelational holism. First, Sheehy associates participation in the development of social
norms, expectations, and practices with group membership. As he states, "To be a
member is to contribute to the formation and/or development or continuation of these
practices through one's attitudes and deeds within a web of relations... I contribute to the
impact others have on me. I am partly determined or shaped by the impact of the
collective I form with others, and it is shaped in part by my reflections and actions."296 If
the perceptions of non-members are partly responsible for the causal powers and
properties of non-voluntary social groups, then, according to Sheehy's account, nonmembers of non-voluntary social groups are in fact group members. As discussed above,
this is not a viable option for Sheehy. Second, the idea that the causal powers and
properties of a social group depend, at least in part, upon the mental states of nonmembers suggests that social groups are ontologically subjective. However, Sheehy
claims that social groups are ontologically objective because the causal powers and
properties of social groups emerge from the relations in which their members stand. An
examination of one of Sheehy's own examples raises doubts about this assertion.
To illustrate how a social group may exert a causal influence on the world,
Sheehy describes a mob that causes a barricade to fall and the guard to flee.297 He argues
that both the fall of the barricade and the guard's behaviour may be attributed to
properties belonging to the mob, specifically its physical strength and its fearsomeness.
The mob's physical strength and fearsomeness emerge from the relations that obtain
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among its participants.298 "It is the collective movement of the individuals forming the
mob that exerts a causal impact on the world. It is their charging the barricade together
that forces it to give way, and puts the guard to flight."299 While reference to the physical
strength of the mob may be adequate to explain the fall of the barricade, reference to its
fearsomeness is not sufficient to explain the reaction of the guard. Imagine that the guard
has never before encountered a mob, does not know what a mob is, and does not know
what a mob is capable of. He is unlikely to flee in fear, just as a child who does not know
better is unlikely to fear a poisonous snake or a busy road. The idea that the guard would
flee in fear from the mob seems plausible only if one assumes that the guard recognizes
the collection of individuals moving rapidly in his direction as a mob and that he
understands that a mob is something that can cause him harm. Sheehy acknowledges that
the fearsomeness of the mob may not be sufficient to explain the response of the guard.
What he does not recognize, however, is that the fearsomeness of the mob depends upon
the perspective of the guard. If the guard does not believe that the mob is something that
can cause him harm, then it is not going to inspire fear in him. I do not deny that a mob
has the potential to induce fear in others, but so does any kind of crowd if the person
observing it suffers from agoraphobia. The ability of the mob to inspire fear in observers
is determined, at least in part, by the perspectives of the observers. The mob is able to
induce fear in observers if and only if they recognize it as a mob and understand a mob as
something to be feared. Some of the causal powers of the mob depend upon the
perspectives of others.
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Sheehy recognizes that social groups are influenced by the beliefs, attitudes and
actions of their members. He contends that the beliefs, attitudes and actions of individual
members shape the relations in which they stand and, thus, the causal properties and
powers that emerge from the relations.300 That is, according to Sheehy, the actions and
mental states of individual group members have an indirect impact on the causal powers
of social groups. However, the example of the guard suggests that the impact is more
direct. Margaret Archer agrees. She maintains that the influence of social groups upon
individuals is "mediated through human agency.'"301 Archer contends that reflexivity
"performs this mediatory role by virtue of the fact that we deliberate about ourselves in
relation to the social situations that we confront, certainly fallibly, certainly incompletely
and necessarily under our own descriptions because that is the only way we can know
anything."302 Human subjectivity explains why different individuals may respond
differently to the same social conditions, and why the same individual may respond
differently on different occasions.303 It is this ability to reflect, deliberate and respond that
accounts for individual agency. Hence, she concludes that, "it is essential to distinguish
between the objective existence of structural (and cultural) emergent properties and the
exercise of their causal powers, since the realisation of their causal powers requires them
to be activated by agents."304
Moreover, whereas Sheehy suggests that only the perspectives of individual
members influence the causal powers of social groups, the example of the guard,
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Hacking's looping effect and the description of non-voluntary social groups offered by
Emcke indicate that how non-members respond to a social group shapes the causal
impact of the group upon both members and non-members.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the importance of the perceptions of others for both
personal and collective identity is noted by Charles Taylor. He writes that,
our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the
/w'srecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them
a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition
or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.305
Emcke agrees that "Recognition and misrecognition are both constitutive parts of the
formation of collective identities."306 How individuals and groups are perceived and
treated by others influences their actions and opportunities. The perceptions and actions
of others may be oppressive or liberating, they may constrain or enhance one's actions
and opportunities. This explains why recognition is central to discussions of social
justice.
For example, Iris Marion Young argues that the systematic oppression of women
will only be acknowledged if they are recognized by others as a social group. Otherwise,
the harms that they experience will be attributed to the actions of individual members or
to the actions of individual non-members. As Young explains,
Without conceptualizing women as a group in some sense, it is not possible to
conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process. If we
obey the injunction to think of people only as individuals, then the disadvantages
and exclusions we call oppressions reduce to individuals in one of two ways.
Either we blame the victims and say that disadvantaged people's choices and
capacities render them less competitive, or we attribute their disadvantage to the
Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25.
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attitudes of other individuals, who for whatever reason don't "like" the
disadvantaged ones. In either case structural and political ways to address and
rectify the disadvantage are written out of the discourse, leaving individuals to
wrestle with their bootstraps.307
Thus, according to Young, to achieve social justice for women, they must be identified
by others as a social group. Only then will the systemic nature of the oppression and
exploitation that women experience be recognized.
Susan Wolf suggests that the oppression and exploitation of women is a
consequence of
first, a failure to recognize women as individuals, with minds, interests, and
talents of their own, who may be more or less comfortable with or indifferent to
the roles their gender has assigned them, and, second, the failure to recognize the
values and the skills involved in the activities traditionally associated with women
and the ways in which experience with and attention to those activities may
enhance rather than limit one's intellectual, artistic, and professional abilities in
other contexts.308
Thus, according to Wolf, it is the misrecognition of women that accounts for their
oppression. To achieve social justice for women, how they are perceived and treated by
others must change.
Yet, Sheehy suggests that social justice requires a change in the beliefs, attitudes,
and actions of group members. He maintains that the causal powers of a social group
(including the social norms, expectations, and practices that govern the actions and
opportunities of its members) are fully determined by members' mutually-affecting
beliefs, actions, and attitudes. Moreover, Sheehy claims that the identities that nonmembers ascribe to a social group are shaped by their experience of its causal powers.
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This suggests that how non-members respond to a social group is determined in part by
the relations that obtain among its members. From this it follows that members of
oppressed social groups are at least partly responsible for their oppression. The groupconstituting relations in which they stand produce powers that cause non-members to
respond to them in a particular way. To change the manner in which a group is perceived
and treated by non-members, the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of its members, and
thereby the relations in which they stand, must change.
Obviously, Sheehy's conception of social grouphood has troubling implications
for theories of oppression and social justice. He may respond, however, that this does not
challenge the credibility of his account since recognition and oppression are matters
related to the individuation, rather than the constitution, of social groups. Yet, Emcke,
Hacking, Young and Wolf suggest that the causal powers of a social group depend upon
the perceptions and actions of non-members. Archer contends that this is because the
causal powers of social groups are mediated by the interpretive frameworks in terms of
which individuals assess the significance of their own and others' circumstances. Both
claims are supported by the example of the guard and the mob. Therefore, if, as Sheehy
suggests, social groups are founded on their causal powers, then the perceptions of
individuals play a role in the constitution, not merely the individuation, of social groups.

IV - Elder-Vass' Theory of Social Grouphood
Dave Elder-Vass suggests that one can account for the idea that the causal
efficacy of a social group depends upon the mental states of individuals without
abandoning the notion that social groups are ontologically objective. Like Sheehy, Elder-
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Vass argues that a social group consists in a collection of interrelated individuals with
unique causal powers. Unique causal powers emerge when certain relations obtain among
individuals.309 According to Elder-Vass, it would be a mistake to attribute these powers
to the individuals and/or the relations in which they stand, for it is only when individuals
are related such that they constitute a social whole or group that they possess these
powers. As he states, "The entities that are [a larger entity] / f s parts would not have this
causal power if they were not organised into an //, hence it is a causal power of//and not
of the parts."310 Thus, the powers belong to the whole and not to the individuals and/or
the relations in which they stand. Moreover, since a social group possesses causal
powers, it is appropriate to describe it as a distinct entity.
Although Sheehy and Elder-Vass agree that a social group consists in a collection
of interrelated individuals with unique causal powers, Elder-Vass' description of the
causal powers of social groups suggests that they are more limited than implied by
Sheehy. Whereas Sheehy claims that social groups can influence the mental states and
actions of non-members, such as the guard, Elder-Vass confines his discussion of the
causal powers of social groups to the effects that they have on the mental states and
actions of group members. According to Elder-Vass, group members behave differently
than they would if they were not group members because their beliefs are influenced by
the social norms, expectations and practices of the groups to which they belong.311
Moreover, like Margaret Archer, Elder-Vass contends that the causal influence of a social
group on an individual member's behaviour is mediated by the interpretive framework
309
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endorsed by the member.312 As he states, "structure can influence individuals without
imposing upon them or reducing them to dopes, since they maintain the capability of
choosing to do otherwise."313 Yet, Elder-Vass also notes that "those choices are
themselves influenced by the set of dispositions and beliefs that the individual has
acquired from their past social experience."314 Thus, "When individuals become parts of
social groups, they do not lose the powers they have as individuals, but those powers are
channelled and constrained as a result of the relations those individuals now have with
others in the group."315 Social groups have "the ability to influence—but not to
determine—-the behaviour of human individuals."316
Sheehy and Elder-Vass also disagree about the nature of the relations that must
obtain among individuals to constitute a social group. Whereas Sheehy argues that groupconstituting relations consist in the mutually-affecting beliefs, actions or attitudes of
group members, Elder-Vass suggests that group-constituting relations may arise as a
consequence of the activities of members and non-members, that is, they may have both
"internal and external" causes.317 Thus, unlike Sheehy, it appears that Elder-Vass is able
to account for non-voluntary social groups of the sort described by Emcke. Like Emcke,
Elder-Vass suggests that the group-constituting relations that obtain among members of
non-voluntary social groups may be determined by the actions and mental states of nonmembers.
312
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V - Social Grouphood and Collective Action
It appears that Elder-Vass' account of social grouphood is able to avoid the
difficulties encountered by Sheehy's theory, for Elder-Vass acknowledges that the causal
impact of a social group is influenced by the perceptions of individuals. However, by
limiting the causal powers of social groups, he may be limiting the possibility of
collective action and responsibility. Like Elder-Vass, Daniel Little argues that, "the only
form of causal influence that social entities have is through their effects on individual
action."318 Social phenomena emerge from and may influence, but do not govern, the
actions and mental states of individuals.319 Social entities influence the actions of
individuals through "incentives, preference formation, belief acquisition, or powers and
opportunities."320 From this, Little concludes that, "Social entities possess causal powers
only in a weak and derivative sense."321 Indeed, he maintains that there is only individual
agency. It is inappropriate to ascribe agency to social groups.
Paul Lewis agrees that "people are the only powerful particulars in society."322 He
argues that because social groups are only able to influence the actions and mental states
of individuals, social groups ought to be considered material rather than efficient causes.
Like Sheehy and Elder-Vass, Lewis contends that the capacity of social groups to
influence individual behaviour emerges from the relations in which individuals stand. It
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is a unique property that arises when group-constituting relations obtain. Moreover,
although social groups can only be material, rather than efficient, causes, since this
property belongs to the group, rather than its members or the relations in which they
stand, Lewis claims that it is appropriate to consider a social group as a distinct entity.323
The theories of Elder-Vass, Little and Lewis suggest that social groups are not
capable of action, at least not in the same way as individuals. Searle, Gilbert and May
argue that an action may be described as collective if it is motivated by a shared
intention. Yet, Elder-Vass' conception of social grouphood implies that collective
intentionality is insufficient to achieve collective action. Unique properties may emerge
from a collection of individuals who are interrelated insofar as they share an intention
such that they constitute a social group. However, the properties that emerge only have
the power to condition, rather than cause, action. Any action that follows is a
consequence of the agency of individual group members. Only individuals can be agents.
Katinka Schulte-Ostermann argues that theories of collective intentionality and
action presuppose a causalist understanding of action whereby "a given human behaviour
counts as an action, if and only if an agent having the intention to perform the action in
question has caused it."324 Accordingly, a collective action is caused by a collection of
individuals who possess the intention to perform the action together. In the case of both
individual and collective action, the action is caused by an agent with the intention to
perform the action. What distinguishes a collective action from an individual action is the
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kind of agent who possesses the intention to perform the action.325 There are two kinds of
agent - individual and collective - and, whereas individual agents cause individual
actions, collective agents cause collective actions. From this it follows that, if, as ElderVass implies, there are no collective agents, then there can be no collective action. Thus,
it appears that to reconcile the notion that only individuals are capable of agency with the
possibility of collective action one must abandon the causalist conception of action.
This is the approach recommended by Schulte-Ostermann. Specifically, she
contends that the idea that actions are caused by agents ought to be abandoned because
theorists are unable to demonstrate that this is the case. Proof of a causal relation between
agent and action is missing, such that "it could be the case that agent and action stand in
the relation of a mere contingent correlation or coincidence."326 Moreover, the intentions
of an agent may be only one of many causes of an action. Hence, causalist conceptions of
action are unable to demonstrate that actions necessarily follow from the intentional
states of agents.327
As an alternative, Schulte-Ostermann recommends a teleological account of
action, which suggests that actions are goal-directed events.328 The goal of the agent did
not cause, but rather directed and therefore explains, the agent's actions. However, it is
not clear that a teleological understanding of action is any more successful than a
causalist understanding, for proponents of causalist accounts of action may argue that a
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teleological conception of action is also causal.329 In directing the action of the agent, the
goal of the agent causes the action.
Like Schulte-Ostermann, Sara Rachel Chant recommends against a causalist
approach to collective action. However, whereas Schulte-Ostermann argues that the
notion that actions are caused by agents ought to be abandoned, Chant contends that the
idea that action requires intentionality ought to be rejected. Chant notes that theories of
collective action tend to assume that collective action is analogous to individual action.330
She argues, however, that there are many kinds of individual action and the kind of
individual action with which theorists tend to associate collective action is not the kind of
individual action to which collective action is most closely analogous.331 Specifically, the
kind of individual action upon which theories of collective action tend to be based
suggests that an action is necessarily intentional. Accordingly, it is assumed that
collective action is necessarily intentional and that an account of collective action
requires an account of collective intentionality. Chant contends that collective action is
more closely analogous to aggregate action than individual intentional action.332 An
aggregate action is a state of affairs that is brought about as a consequence of multiple
intentional actions. To illustrate, Chant offers the example of a shepherd who
unintentionally ruins a piece of land by intentionally having his flock graze on the same
piece of land two days in a row.333 Although the actions of the shepherd were intentional,
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the state of affairs that these actions caused was not. Thus, aggregate action need not be
intentional. She maintains that collective action is analogous to aggregate action insofar
as a collective action is a state of affairs that is brought about as a consequence of
multiple intentional actions. What differentiates individual aggregate action and
collective aggregate action is the number of agents. To illustrate, Chant offers the
example of two shepherds who unintentionally ruin a piece of land by intentionally
having their flocks graze on the same piece of land on consecutive days.334 Although the
actions of the shepherds were intentional, the state of affairs that their actions caused was
not. Hence, Chant concludes that collective action need not be intentional.
Chant recognizes that an understanding of collective action based on aggregate
action may lead to the notion that every state of affairs brought about by two or more
persons constitutes a collective action. She argues that this kind of universalism can be
avoided by adopting the strategy of foundationahst theories of action, which suggest that
actions exist on a hierarchy such that some actions are higher or more complex while
others are lower or more basic. Chant claims that a collective action may be understood
as a complex state of affairs that emerges from the interrelated basic actions of
individuals, thereby distinguishing collective action from mere aggregate action
performed by multiple agents.335
There is reason to believe, however, that the interrelations that differentiate
collective action and aggregate action are the relations that exist among the intentions of
the agents involved. Consider the example of an orchestra playing a symphony. Each
member of the orchestra performs an action that contributes to the state of affairs wherein
334
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a symphony is performed. What seems to account for their individual actions being
described as contributions to the performance of a symphony is the fact that their
individual actions are motivated by the same intention, namely to perform a symphony. If
the members of the orchestra were sitting in different rooms simultaneously playing
pieces of music that they did not realize were components of a symphony and unaware
that other musicians were doing the same, then although a symphony was played and
each member of the orchestra contributed to the performance of it, it would seem to
qualify as the performance of an aggregate action rather than a collective one. Collective
action involves doing something together, and, in this scenario, the members of the
orchestra are not doing something together. Instead, as in Chant's example of the two
shepherds, each member of the orchestra is doing something on his or her own. It just
happens to be the case that their intentional actions are also components of another
unintentional action. What seems to differentiate collective and aggregate action is the
kind of intentionality and mutual awareness described in the theories of collective
intentionality considered above.
Still, Chant may be correct to suggest that collective action is more closely
analogous to aggregate action than individual intentional action insofar as collective
action refers to a state of affairs brought about by the actions of multiple individual
agents rather than a state of affairs brought about by the actions of a single causallyefficient entity. The difficulties confronting the theories of Schulte-Ostermann and Chant
indicate that the component of causalist conceptions of action that needs to be abandoned
is neither the notion that actions are caused by agents, nor the idea that collective action
is intentional. Rather, to account for collective action, one must reject the suggestion that
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collective actions are caused by collective agents, and accept that both individual and
collective actions are caused by individual agents. What is required, then, is an
explanation of the difference between individual and collective action that is consistent
with the notion that only individuals are agents.

VI - Conclusion
In the previous chapter I suggested that an understanding of social groups as
concepts that refer to interrelated individuals is unable to support the idea of collective
action. Consequently, in this chapter I examined a realist conception of social grouphood.
Paul Sheehy contends that a social group is a distinct entity with unique causal powers
and properties that emerges when the beliefs, actions or attitudes of individuals are
mutually-affecting. Although Sheehy's theory is able to account for collective action, like
the proposals of Searle and Gilbert, it is unable to explain non-voluntary social groups.
Non-voluntary social groups, as defined by Emcke, consist in collections of
individuals who have had an identity (and the social norms, expectations, and practices
associated with it) imposed upon them. That is, to constitute a non-voluntary social group
a collection of individuals must be perceived and treated by others as a social group.
Sheehy contends that the perceptions of non-members are relevant to the individuation,
but not to the constitution, of social groups. The only way to reconcile his account with
the conception of non-voluntary groups proposed by Emcke is to identify any nonmembers whose perceptions and actions influence the social norms, expectations, and
practices of a social group as members, for Sheehy maintains that group-constituting
relations only emerge from the perceptions and actions of group members. This,
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however, robs his theory of its utility as a means of differentiating between social groups
and other social entities. Moreover, my analysis of one of Sheehy's own examples
suggests that the perceptions of non-members are relevant to the causal powers and
properties, and therefore relevant to the constitution, of social groups. Thus, it seems that
Sheehy's realist theory of social grouphood is untenable.
Yet, a tenable realist account raises doubts about the possibility of collective
action, the very issue that a realist account was meant to resolve. Like Sheehy, ElderVass argues that a social group consists in a collection of interrelated individuals with
unique causal powers. However, unlike Sheehy, Elder-Vass maintains that the causal
powers of social groups are mediated by the perspectiyes of individuals, both members
and non-members. According to Little and Lewis, the notion that the causal powers of
social groups are mediated by the perspectives of individuals suggests that social groups
influence, but do not determine, the actions of individuals. That is, social groups can
condition, but not cause, action. Thus, social groups are not agents.
Schulte-Ostermann and Chant suggest that this conclusion assumes a causalist
understanding of action. They contend that the idea of collective action can be saved by
either abandoning the notion that agents cause actions or by rejecting the proposition that
collective actions are necessary. I argued that neither of these approaches is successful.
Instead, what is required is rejection of the causalist notion that collective action is
necessarily caused by a collective agent. This possibility will be pursued in the chapter
that follows.
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Chapter Four: Collective Intentionality, Action and Responsibility
I - Introduction
I have now considered two conceptions of social grouphood that, with some
modifications, appear able to avoid the difficulties encountered by the theories of Searle,
Gilbert and Sheehy. In Chapter Two, I examined Larry May's conceptual account of
social groups. May describes a social group as a concept that refers to interrelated
individuals. He maintains that social relations are sufficient to explain the capacity of
individuals to engage in collective behaviour. However, as discussed in Chapter Three,
Dave Elder-Vass' realist theory of social groups suggests that from the relations that
obtain among individuals social groups emerge as distinct entities, which influence, but
do not determine, individual conduct.
Aside from the fact that they disagree about whether or not social groups are real,
the conceptions of social grouphood proposed by May and Elder-Vass are very similar.
First, they agree that a social group consists in a collection of interrelated individuals.
Second, they agree that, as a result of the relations in which they stand, members of a
social group are able to perform actions that they could not otherwise perform. Finally,
both May and Elder-Vass suggest that only individuals can be agents. According to
May's theory, collectives are incapable of agency because they are not real. Elder-Vass,
on the other hand, argues that the causal efficacy of collectives is limited to influencing,
but not determining, individual action. Despite these similarities, debate about the reality
of social groups continues.

It is not my intention to contribute to this debate. Instead, I
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David Copp disagrees. He argues that "certain collectives are capable of acting
intentionally," and, therefore, may be held responsible for their actions.340 He proposes a
"constitutional account" of collective intentional action. According to Copp, it is
appropriate to ascribe intentionality to a collective when certain relations obtain among
the intentions of its individual members. The intentionality of the collective consists in
the intentionality of its members.341 Copp maintains that the same may be said of
collective action. He contends that action may be ascribed to a collective when certain
relations obtain among the actions of its individual members such that individual
members of the collective may be described as acting on behalf of the collective. That is,
the contributory actions of individual members constitute the action of the collective.342
Moreover, Copp argues that collectives may be held responsible for these actions. When
individuals act on behalf of a collective, the collective is responsible for the outcome of
their actions. He concludes that, since only agents can be responsible for their actions,
collectives must be agents.343
Similarly, Gregory Mellema maintains that when individual members of a
collective perform contributory actions such that the resulting action or state of affairs
may be ascribed to the collective, the collective may be held responsible for the action.
Indeed, he argues that individuals may be held collectively responsible for a state of
affairs, even if they are not individually responsible for the state of affairs, if they belong
to the responsible collective. To belong to the responsible collective, one must qualify for
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membership.

There are several ways in which one may qualify for membership. First,

one may intentionally contribute to the state of affairs by either intentionally performing
a contributory action or intentionally refraining from performing an action. In this case
one would be both individually responsible for one's action or inaction and part of the
collective that is collectively responsible for the state of affairs. Second, one may qualify
for membership in the responsible collective by encouraging, assisting, or allowing others
to perform contributory actions or contribute by refraining from performing actions.
Third, one may unintentionally contribute to a state of affairs and thereby qualify for
membership in a responsible collective by promising to perform an action or promising to
refrain from performing an action. Similarly, one may unintentionally contribute to a
state of affairs for which a collective is responsible by engaging in risky behaviour.
Finally, Mellema contends that an individual may become a member of a collective that
is responsible for a state of affairs by performing an action or failing to perform an action
that has unanticipated consequences that should have been anticipated. In other words,
individuals who are culpably ignorant of the consequences of their actions may qualify as
members of a responsible collective.345 Thus, according to Mellema, an individual "must
in some suitably weak sense contribute to the occurrence of an event in order to attain
membership in the collective that is responsible for it."346
Both Copp and Mellema suggest that when individuals perform actions as
members of, and hence on behalf of, a collective, the resulting state of affairs may be
described as a collective action and the collective may be held responsible for it. From
344

Gregory Mellema, "Collective Responsibility and Qualifying Actions," Midwest
Studies in Philosophy Vol. 30 (2006): 168-9.
345
Ibid, 169-75.
346
Ibid, 169.
132

this Copp concludes that at least some collectives are agents. This conclusion is not
proposed by Mellema, and it is not clear that it necessarily follows. The idea that
collectives are agents follows from the notion that a collective may be held responsible
for the interrelated actions of its members if and only if one assumes that when certain
relations obtain among the actions of individuals a distinct entity emerges. According to
May, the idea that it is appropriate to describe an action as collective and hold the
collective responsible for it if it is the product of interrelated individual actions is also
consistent with the notion that a collective is merely a concept that refers to a collection
of interrelated individuals.
May contends that "basic actions can only be engaged in by individual
persons."347 Nevertheless, "actions are predicable of groups, even though the groups do
not exist independently of the persons who are members of the group."348 Actions that
may be ascribed to a collective are in fact the actions of interrelated individuals. In the
case of unorganized collectives, the relationship of solidarity "makes it possible for the
actions of these individuals to be treated as if they were the actions of a single entity,"
even though no such entity exists.349 Even in the case of organized collectives, such as
corporations, May insists that they are agents only in a vicarious sense. He argues that "it
is a mistake to view corporations as agents in the standard senses of the
term.. .Corporations can only act, vicariously, that is, through other persons, and for this
reason should be given a unique status as agents."350 Just as the relationship of solidarity
justifies the ascription of actions to an unorganized collective, the formal relationships
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that exist among members of a corporation justify the ascription of actions to the
corporation. There is nothing "like a new object which can be said to be acting instead of
the individual persons. The individuals remain the object agents, and the corporation only
manifests event causation."351 Yet, May contends that it is appropriate to hold collectives
responsible "in a sense" for collective actions.352 The corporate relations and relations of
solidarity that account for collective action also explain ascriptions of collective
responsibility. From these relations shared intentions emerge, intentions to act or refrain
from acting so as to contribute to the realization of a certain state of affairs.353 A
collective may be held responsible for a state of affairs if each member contributed to it
by acting, facilitating the actions of other members, or failing to act.354

Ill - Collective Action as Joint Action
Contrary to Corlett and Copp, May suggests that collective action and
responsibility do not require collective agency. It is sufficient for certain relations to
obtain among the intentional actions of individual members of the collective. According
to David Schweikard, where May disagrees with Corlett and Copp marks the difference
between collective action and joint action.355 As we will see, several theories of joint
action have been developed. There is, however, disagreement among these theories about
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the kind of relations that must exist among the actions of individuals to account for joint
action.
Philip Pettit and David Schweikard define a joint action as "an action that we
together perform."356 A joint action requires that each participant be motivated by the
intention that they perform the action together, and each participant is motivated by the
intention that they perform the action together insofar as each participant intends to do his
or her part to ensure that the objective is achieved. Furthermore, each participant intends
to do his or her part only insofar as he or she believes that 1) the others intend to do their
parts and 2) all participants believe that all participants intend to do their parts.357 Thus, a
collection of individuals perform a joint action if and only if
1.
2.
3.
4.

they each intend that they perform the action together;
they each intend to do their part;
they each believe that others intend to do their parts;
they each intend to do their part because they believe that others intend to do
their parts; and

5. they each believe that 1 through 4 are true.358
Pettit and Schweikard argue that a joint action does not require "a single intending
subject."

Rather, "it is we severally who intend that we act together."

Although each

participant has the intention that they perform the action together, they each have their
own intention. What they have in common is the same objective.
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While joint action may not require collective agency, Pettit and Schweikard do
not deny that collective agency is possible. Indeed, joint action is a condition of collective
agency. They contend that collective agency obtains when individuals "come together to
construct novel agents: agents that have a distinct intentional profile from the profiles of
their members."361 Construction of a novel agent requires that a collection of individuals
"act jointly so as to set up suitable ends, a suitable body of judgments for guiding the
pursuit of those ends, and a structure of agency for promoting those ends according to
those judgments."362 When these conditions are satisfied, a collective agent will emerge
to "pursue various actions, and do so with intention. And the intentions it enacts will be
its own.
The account of collective agency proposed by Pettit and Schweikard is similar to
Sheehy's conception of social grouphood insofar as both theories suggest that a collective
agent with unique causal powers emerges when certain relations obtain among a
collection of individuals. Moreover, like Sheehy, Pettit and Schweikard fail to take into
account the extent to which the causal powers of social groups depend on how they are
perceived by individuals. Indeed, they imply that once a collective agent has been
created, its dependence on individual actions and mental states ends. However, as
discussed in Chapter Three, how an individual responds to a social group depends on the
meaning that he or she ascribes to it. Since the meanings associated with a social group
are subject to ongoing debate and negotiation, so too is its ability to shape individual
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behaviour. Hence, there is reason to reject the account of collective agency proposed by
Pettit and Schweikard. Still, the notion of joint action may be worth pursuing.
Seumas Miller proposes an account of joint action that is similar to the theory of
joint action developed by Pettit and Schweikard. Miller argues that a joint action involves
a collection of individuals performing individual actions that contribute to and are
motivated by a "collective end."364 A collective end is "an end that is not realized by one
individual acting alone."365 To be motivated by this collective end, each participant must
believe that the others share this end and intend to perform individual actions that will
contribute to its realization. Miller contends that it is appropriate to consider participants
in a joint action as jointly responsible for the action since it is as a consequence of thenindividual, interdependent actions that the joint action is achieved. It is the collective end
motivating individual actions of participants that accounts for the interdependence of
their actions.366 Each participant is individually responsible for his or her individual
action and all of the participants are jointly responsible for the outcome that their
individual actions produce. Moreover, if the joint action is morally significant, then,
according to Miller, each participant is individually morally responsible for his or her
individual action and all of the participants are jointly morally responsible for the
outcome that their individual actions produce. Unlike Pettit and Schweikard, Miller
suggests that it is inappropriate to ascribe moral responsibility to a collective understood
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as a distinct entity.

Instead, he maintains that collective action is best understood as

joint action and collective responsibility is best understood as joint responsibility.
Raimo Tuomela agrees with Pettit, Schweikard and Miller that a joint action
requires that a collection of individuals share an intention to do something together.
However, Tuomela rejects their accounts of what sharing an intention to do something
together involves. Whereas Pettit, Schweikard and Miller suggest that sharing an
objective is sufficient, Tuomela maintains that joint action requires that participants
jointly intend to perform the action together. A collection of individuals jointly intends to
perform an action together when each individual we-intends to perform the action
together, that is, when they recognize themselves and one another as group members and
intend to behave in accordance with an objective (to perform a particular joint action)
endorsed by the group.368 On the basis of his or her we-intention, each participant
formulates an I-intention to perform his or her part of the joint action. Ultimately, what
accounts for the individual actions of the participants are their we-intentions, and,
collectively, their we-intentions constitute a joint intention. Thus, a joint action is
motivated by a joint intention.369 The actions described by Pettit, Schweikard and Miller
do not qualify as joint actions, according to Tuomela, because, although the individual
actions of the participants are interdependent, the actions of the participants are motivated
by their own individual intentions (I-intentions that they perform the action together) as
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opposed to intentions that they have negotiated and endorsed as a group (we-intentions
that they perform the action together).370
It appears that there are at least two possible interpretations of joint action, an
individualist interpretation and a collectivist interpretation. Moreover, both are
compatible with the notion that only individuals are agents. However, there is reason to
prefer the collectivist interpretation. The accounts proposed by Pettit, Schweikard and
Miller suggest that joint action is achieved when individuals possess the same individual
intentions and beliefs. As discussed in Chapter One, Searle and Gilbert maintain that
individual intentions and beliefs are insufficient to explain collective intentionality.
Searle argues that individual intentionality fails to capture the sense of cooperation that
collective intentionality implies, and Gilbert contends that individualist theories are
unable to account for the kind of commitment that collective intentionality entails.
Furthermore, like the theories of social grouphood proposed by Searle, Gilbert, and May,
individualist conceptions of joint action seem to rely on sameness among the mental
states of individuals. That is, individuals must possess the same individual intentions and
beliefs to perform a joint action. Consequently, they are unable to account for the fact
that, as a consequence of differences among their interpretative frameworks, individuals
who appear to share an intention or belief may, nevertheless, possess different
understandings of what that intention or belief entails.
In Chapter Two I suggested that the theories Dean and Weir could help to resolve
this problem of sameness for conceptions of social grouphood. I believe their theories can
do the same for conceptions of collective or joint intentionality. According to Dean and
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Weir, sameness among the interpretive frameworks of individuals need not obtain for
individuals to share an understanding of themselves as group members. Instead,
individuals can come to share an understanding of themselves as group members when
they engage with one another about what group membership entails and identify with the
plural subject that emerges from the ongoing dialogue. Similarly, one may argue that
sameness among the interpretative frameworks of individuals need not obtain for
individuals to share an intention. Rather, individuals can come to share an intention when
they engage with one another about what the intention entails and identify with the
intention that emerges from the ongoing dialogue, that is, they allow that intention to
guide their behaviour.
When a dialogical approach is applied to the idea of collective or joint
intentionality, an interpretation emerges that is similar to the one proposed by Tuomela.
Joint intentionality requires engagement with the other. One possesses a we-intention
when one identifies with and is motivated by the intention that emerges from that
dialogue. This we-intention motivates and coordinates the individual actions of group
members.
One may argue, however, that while Tuomela's theory of joint action may explain
situations in which members of a pre-existing collective have the opportunity to discuss
their actions before engaging in them, it does not account for joint actions by collectives
that lack structure and whose members have not engaged in dialogue. May's example of
a mob comes to mind. He notes that, despite their lack of organizational structure, mobs
can exhibit seemingly purposive behaviour.371 May attributes this purposive behaviour to
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shared pre-reflective intentions that emerge from feelings of solidarity, which, in turn,
emerge from the perception of common interests among mob participants.372 May's
conception of joint intentionality differs from that of Tuomela insofar as May suggests
that joint intentionality requires sameness. May argues that solidarity is achieved when
individuals recognize themselves as the same to the extent that they have interests in
common.373 Moreover, he claims that the pre-reflective intentions that emerge from
feelings of solidarity and motivate the individual actions of mob participants are the
same.374 Thus, May is able to account for joint intentionality among unorganized groups,
although he appeals to sameness to do so.
However, Brook Jenkins Sadler and Axel Seemann suggest that one need not
appeal to sameness to explain joint intentionality among unorganized collectives. Sadler
maintains that identification and engagement with the other need not be dialogical. She
states that, "There are a number of ways in which agents may come to know others'
intentions.. .in everyday contexts, shared intentions are often expressed nonverbally,
through an exchange of glances, the upward lift of the chin, or a squeeze of the hand, for
example."375 Axel Seemann agrees. He notes that the attitudes and intentions of others
are often revealed to us through their actions. That is, "we come to understand the
"intentional life" of others "through bodily interactions."376 Individuals acquire this
capacity to attend to the other when, as infants, they "engage in episodes of mutual
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attention with their caregivers."377 We also learn from our significant others how to
"jointly attend to third objects."378 Seemann insists that this kind of inter subjectivity and
joint attention is "a prerequisite of joint action."379 Individuals engage in joint action
when they communicate attitudes and intentions as they attend to and act on a third
object. Seemann describes the experience of acting jointly as "an experience of us as a
common cause."380 He argues that his conception of joint action explains both the
experience of togetherness and the sense of joint control that joint action entails.381
Seemann suggests that trust explains how these feelings of togetherness and joint
control may be reconciled with the fact that participants in a cooperative activity are
individual agents. From the fact that participants are individual agents it follows that they
may cease to behave cooperatively. That is, one's control over the actions of other
participants is limited. Thus, when one is engaged in a joint action one must assume or
trust that the other participants will continue to contribute to the joint action.382 As he
states, "To trust someone, in joint projects, is to take it that the trusted person will not
disappoint the expectation that her doings will be characterized by a certain amount of
good will and skill."383 Participants' trust in one another may be, like their attitudes and
intentions, "embodied."384 Their trust in one another may be revealed in their actions as
they continue to do their part. Thus, joint action requires that participants perceive one
another as cooperative agents. The sense of togetherness and joint control that are
377
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characteristic of joint action are "rooted in perceptual experience," and consequently,
"joint engagements of the enacted and embodied kind.. .are spontaneously possible for
complete strangers."385 As Seemann states,
If attending to one another, one is exchanging not just glances with the other
person; some sort of communication appears to be taking place. A stranger
walking past smiles at me and I smile back; a student tells her teacher, looking her
in the eye, that she didn't come to class because she was sick; two drivers focus
on each other to sort out who gets to cross the intersection first: in all these
situations the protagonists are involved in some kind of sharing.386
The notion that strangers can spontaneously engage with one another suggests
that a dialogical account of joint action need not be restricted to the activities of
established collectives. Through their actions strangers may communicate their own
intentions and their attitudes regarding the actions and intentions of others, and thereby
engage in a kind of non-verbal dialogue. The claims of Sadler and Seemann also suggest
that joint action among unorganized collectives need not be predicated on sameness.
Strangers need not perceive one another as the same to jointly attend to a third object.
According to Seemann, they need only be receptive "to one another's embodied
psychologies."387
Hence, it appears that a tenable account of collective or joint action that does not
rely on the idea of collective agency is possible. According to this account, joint or
collective action obtains when individuals engage with one another and allow the weintention that emerges from their engagement to guide and coordinate their individual
actions. This understanding of joint action suggests that joint action is the product of the
coordinated actions of individual agents. What coordinates their actions is their
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endorsement of the we-intention that they create through verbal and/or non-verbal
dialogue.

IV - The Possibility of Collective Moral Responsibility
Theories of collective moral responsibility tend to assume that collectives have
the capacity for agency. Indeed, they tend to claim that collectives may be held morally
responsible for certain states of affairs because they are agents. For example, Philip Pettit
argues that it is appropriate to ascribe responsibility to a collective when the following
conditions are met:
Value relevance —The group is an autonomous agent that faces a significant
choice between doing something good or bad or right or wrong.
Value judgment —The group has the understanding and the access to evidence
required for making judgments about the relative value of such options.
Value sensitivity —The group has the control required for being able to choose
between the options on the basis of its judgments about their respective value.388
Pettit contends that these conditions of agency are satisfied by organized collectives, such
as corporations and, therefore, it is appropriate to ascribe responsibility to them.389
Similarly, Kay Mathiesen maintains that a collective may be held morally responsible for
a states of affairs if the collective qualifies as a moral agent and if the state of affairs is a
consequence of the collective exercising its moral agency.390 She defines a moral agent as
an entity that "has a perspective, has a capacity for second-order reflection, and is
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sensitive to moral reasons," and argues that collectives satisfy these conditions.391 As
discussed in the Introduction, Sheehy contends that moral responsibility may be ascribed
to a collective if, in addition to its capacity to have a causal impact on the world, the
collective possesses the capacity for deliberation and reflection.392
These theories suggest that moral responsibility requires intentionality and
causation. Specifically, a collective may be held morally responsible for a state of affairs
if it is causally responsible for the state of affairs and its actions were motivated by an
intention to bring about the state of affairs.
The notion that moral responsibility requires causal responsibility is consistent
with what Carolina Sartorio describes as the "Entailment-Dependence" view regarding
the relationship between moral responsibility and causation. According to this view, "An
agent A is morally responsible for an outcome O only if A is causally responsible for O,
i.e. only if one of A's actions and omissions caused O; moreover, the fact that one of A's
actions or omissions caused O (partly) explains the fact that A is morally responsible for
O."393 Sartorio contends that the Entailment-Dependence view is the "most widely held"
of all theories that attempt to explain the relationship between moral responsibility and
causation, and she attributes this to the fact that it accords with our intuitions.394
My analysis of theories of social grouphood suggests that a tenable conception of
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social grouphood does not support the idea that collectives are agents. From this one may
conclude that it is inappropriate to ascribe responsibility to a collective. As discussed in
the Introduction, this is the conclusion reached by Lewis, Narveson, Watkins and
Sverdlik. It seems that one must reach this conclusion if one accepts the EntailmentDependence view. However, the dialogical conception of joint action discussed above
suggests that collective actions may be characterized as joint actions. If collective actions
may be characterized as joint actions, then, perhaps, collective responsibility may be
characterized as joint responsibility.

V - Collective Moral Responsibility as Joint Moral Responsibility
Theories of joint responsibility have been proposed. For example, as mentioned
above, May claims that when the individual actions or inactions of members of a
collective are motivated by shared intentions and account for a certain state of affairs, it is
appropriate to hold the members of the collective jointly responsible for the state of
affairs. That is, there is a "sense" in which the collective is responsible.395 Similarly,
Miller maintains that individuals who achieve a joint action by performing individual
actions that are motivated by a shared objective are jointly responsible for the joint action
and individually responsible for their contributory actions. Moreover, if the joint action is
morally significant, then the individuals who performed contributory actions are jointly
morally responsible.396
Like the theories of joint action on which they are predicated, the theories of joint
responsibility proposed by May and Miller are problematic insofar as they require
395
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sameness among group members. However, Brook Jenkins Sadler proposes an account of
joint responsibility that does not require sameness, and, therefore, is able to avoid this
problem. Sadler contends that individuals may be described as sharing an intention when
the intention of each individual is motivated by the intentions of the other participants,
such that "the reason you intend to do X is that I intend to do Y and the reason I intend to
do Y is that you intend to do X."397 That is, the action of each individual is caused, in
part, by the fact that the other participants possess a particular intention. The intention
possessed by each individual is an individual intention insofar as it is an I-intention to
perform an action X. Mere possession of the I-intention is sufficient to cause another
individual to develop an I-intention to perform an action Y. Consequently, the individuals
whose intentions cause development of an I-intention in another individual are
responsible for the intention and action of the individual.398 When individual intentions
are interrelated in this way, according to Sadler, one may claim that the participants share
an intention and are, therefore, causally and morally responsible for the actions that issue
from it.399
Sadler notes that there is a tendency among theories of collective responsibility to
focus on the distribution of causal responsibility among group members rather than
shared intentions.400 She claims to be offering an account of collective responsibility
predicated on intentionality rather than causality. Yet, it appears that Sadler has
developed a causal understanding of collective or joint responsibility. Individuals share
an intention when an interdependent causal relationship exists among their individual
397
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intentions. It is the causal relationship among the intentions, rather than the intentions
themselves, that accounts for joint or collective intentionality and joint intentionality is
what explains joint responsibility. However, the notion that an individual's possession of
an intention can cause an intention in another individual seems to undermine the
possibility of autonomous agency. To avoid this problem Sadler may suggest instead that
the intentions of individuals condition the intentions of other individuals. However, this
option is also problematic. As discussed in Chapter Two, it has been suggested that all
actions and intentions are conditioned by one's significant others. If this is the case, then
Sadler's account does not allow one to differentiate between individual and joint
intentionality, and, consequently, does not allow one to differentiate between individual
and joint responsibility.
Still, there may be reason to pursue an understanding of moral responsibility that
does not require causal responsibility. Sartorio suggests that, alone, the EntailmentDependence view is unable to fully explain the relationship between moral responsibility
and causation. For example, it can only explain our tendency to hold agents morally
responsible for outcomes that are attributable to their failure to act if one accepts that a
failure to act may be considered a cause. She notes that this is incompatible with the
claim that only events can be causes.401 Sartorio argues that this problem may be resolved
by 1) describing an omission as a counterfactual, wherein a certain state of affairs would
not have occurred had an individual acted in a particular way, 2) thinking about the
omission as quasi-cause of the outcome, and 3) revising the Entailment-Dependence view
such that "A is morally responsible for O only if A is either causally or quasi-causally
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responsible for O, i.e. only if one of A's actions or omissions either caused or quasicaused O; moreover, the fact that one of A's actions or omissions either caused or quasicaused O (partly) explains the fact that A is morally responsible for O."402
However, according to Sartorio, neither the original nor the revised account of the
Entailment-Dependence view is able to explain situations in which there is more than one
sufficient cause or no sufficient cause. For example, one can imagine a situation in which
two individuals stab a third individual and each stab wound is sufficient to cause the
death of the victim. Our intuitions would suggest that both attackers are morally
responsible for the death of the victim. Also, Sartorio describes a situation in which one
would-be murderer attempts to cause the death of an individual who is planning a trip to
the desert by replacing his or her water with poison, while a second would-be murderer,
unaware that the water has been replaced, pierces a hole in the container with the intent to
cause the individual to die of thirst. The individual subsequently travels to the desert and
dies of thirst. In this case, the actions of neither would-be murderer were sufficient to
cause the death of the individual. Yet, one would be tempted to ascribe morally
responsibility to both of them. These examples imply that one need not be the cause, or
the only cause, of a state of affairs to be held morally responsible for it.403
From these examples, Sartorio concludes that, although moral responsibility for a
state of affairs depends in some way on causal responsibility, it does not require that the
individuals to whom moral responsibility is ascribed be causally responsible for the state
of affairs. Instead, she suggests that they need only be causally responsible for their
contributory actions or omissions to be held morally responsible for the outcome of their
402
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actions or omissions. In other words, "A is morally responsible for O only if A is morally
responsible for a cause of O; moreover, the fact that A is morally responsible for a cause
of O (partly) explains the fact that A is morally responsible for O."404 She refers to this
account of the relationship between moral responsibility and causation as the
"Transmission-Dependence" view.405
From Sartorio's theory it follows that a collective need not be the cause of an
outcome to be held morally responsible for it. In other words, collective moral
responsibility does not require collective agency. She maintains that the causal
responsibility that grounds ascriptions of moral responsibility applies to the actions that
contribute to the outcome, but not to the outcome itself. However, moral responsibility is
associated with the outcome. Thus, if a certain state of affairs is brought about by the
actions of a collection of individuals, then each individual is causally responsible for his
or her action and, since the state of affairs is a consequence of all of their actions, they are
collective or jointly morally responsible for it.
This understanding of joint moral responsibility is compatible with both an
individualist and a coUectivist conception of joint action, for all that Sartorio's account of
the relationship between moral responsibility and causation requires is multiple
contributory actions. How the contributory actions are related is irrelevant. Indeed, aside
from the fact that all of the actions contribute to the outcome, it seems that the actions
need not be related at all. Hence, her theory is also compatible with Chant's account of
collective action as aggregate action.
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However, moral responsibility also tends to be associated with intentionality. In
the previous chapter I argued that what distinguishes aggregate action from collective
action is collective intentionality. Moreover, the conceptions of joint action considered
above suggest that intentionality is what accounts for the jointness of joint action. Joint
intentionality is what motivates and coordinates the contributory actions for which
individual participants are causally responsible. Joint intentionality coordinates the
actions of individual participants by directing them toward achievement of a particular
outcome. Given this relationship between intentionality and the outcome of the actions of
individual agents, perhaps intentionality can explain the jointness of both joint action and
joint moral responsibility. Sartorio claims that causation cannot account for the jointness
of joint morally responsibility because causal responsibility applies to the contributory
actions of individual agents rather than the outcome of those actions. Although they
disagree about the nature of the intention, the theories of joint action discussed above
suggest that an intention to produce a particular outcome is common to all of the
contributory actions of individual participants. Thus, intentionality may explain how it is
possible to have moral responsibility for an outcome without causal responsibility for the
outcome.
As Alfred Mele and Steven Sverdlik note, however, moral responsibility does not
require intentionality. Actions may produce unintended consequences for which agents
are likely to be held morally responsible.406 For example, a drunk driver who
unintentionally kills a pedestrian is likely to be considered morally responsible for the
pedestrian's death. Nevertheless, it remains the case that we do tend to hold agents
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morally responsible for the consequences of their actions when the consequences are
brought about intentionally, and it is with the intentional actions of collectives that we are
currently concerned. Together, Sartorio's theory regarding the relationship between
moral responsibility and causation and theories of joint action suggest that individual
causal responsibility and joint intentionality may be sufficient for collective or joint
moral responsibility, and, therefore, one may reject the notion that collectives are capable
of agency without abandoning the idea of collective moral responsibility.

VI - Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the implications of the theories of social
grouphood proposed by May and Elder-Vass for conceptions of collective action and
collective moral responsibility. Accounts of collective action and collective moral
responsibility tend to assume that collectives are capable of agency. However, May and
Elder-Vass suggest that only individuals can be agents. This has led some theorists to
question that possibility of collective action and collective moral responsibility. Others
have proposed that the problem of collective agency may be avoided by conceiving
collective action and collective moral responsibility as joint action and joint moral
responsibility. I have argued that a dialogical understanding of joint action is tenable and,
when combined with Sartorio's account of the relationship between moral responsibility
and causation, can support the idea of joint moral responsibility. Thus, it appears that the
idea that collectives are incapable of agency does not undermine the possibility of
collective action and collective moral responsibility.
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Conclusion
As discussed in the Introduction, there is disagreement among theorists about
whether or not it is appropriate to ascribe moral responsibility to collectives. Among
scholars who agree that it is, there is disagreement about why it is appropriate. Tracy
Isaacs argues that it is appropriate to ascribe moral responsibility to a collective because
collective moral responsibility cannot be fully explained in terms of individual moral
responsibility. That is, collective moral responsibility is irreducible. She maintains that
collective moral responsibility is irreducible because collective actions cannot be fully
explained in terms of the actions of their individual members. Collective actions cannot
be fully explained in terms of individual actions because collective actions are motivated
by collective intentionality, and collective intentionality cannot be fully explained in
terms of individual intentionality because collective intentionality consists in individual
intentions and the relations that exist among them.
John Searle and Margaret Gilbert agree with Isaacs that collective action requires
collective intentionality and that collective intentionality is irreducible. However, the
conceptions of collective intentionality that they endorse differ from the account
recommended by Isaacs. Whereas Isaacs supports Michael Bratman's claim that
collective intentionality obtains when a collection of individuals shares an I-intention that
the group jointly engage in the performance of a particular activity, Searle contends that
collective intentionality is a kind of mental state, and Gilbert argues that collective
intentionality requires a joint commitment among a collection of individuals to a
particular we-intention.
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Although Paul Sheehy agrees with Isaacs, Searle and Gilbert that collectives may
be held morally responsible for their actions, he denies that collective moral
responsibility requires collective intentionality. Instead, Sheehy argues that collectives
may be held morally responsible for their actions if, like individual moral agents, they
possess the capacity for deliberation and reflection.
I have suggested that disagreement among theories of collective intentionality,
collective action and collective moral responsibility may be attributed to differences
among the conceptions of collectivity or social grouphood upon which they are
predicated. My examination of some of these conceptions of social grouphood has
revealed problems, problems which call into question the plausibility of the theories of
collective intentionality, collective action and collective moral responsibility they are
meant to support.
In Chapter One I discussed the intentionalist theories of social grouphood
proposed by John Searle and Margaret Gilbert. They maintain that social grouphood
obtains when a collection of individuals share a we-intention. Whereas Searle contends
that sharing a we-intention involves possessing the same mental state, Gilbert claims that
a we-intention is shared when individuals are jointly committed to it. Although they
disagree about what it means to share a we-intention, they share a commitment to
ontological individualism, that is, to the notion that the relationship between social groups
and their individual members is asymmetrical such that the individuals are primary. I have
argued that their shared commitment to ontological individualism explains their inability
to adequately account for the causal relationship between social groups and their
individual members, the heterogeneity of social groups and non-voluntary social groups.
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In Chapter Two I examined Larry May's conception of social groups as nothing
more than individuals and the relations in which they stand. I found that, like the
conceptions of social grouphood developed by Searle and Gilbert, May's theory fails to
account for the heterogeneity of social groups. It was my contention that this difficulty
could be overcome by incorporating elements of the accounts of collective identity
proposed by Dean and Weir. Whereas May claims that individuals must have properties
in common and recognize one another as the same to share feelings of solidarity and
thereby constitute a social group, Dean and Weir suggest that solidarity may be achieved
through engagement with the other. However, even with these modifications, I argued that
May's account of social groups as concepts that refer to interrelated individuals is unable
to support the notion of collective action.
Paul Sheehy's realist conception of social grouphood was examined in Chapter
Three. Sheehy argues that a social group is a material object with unique causal powers
and properties that emerges when mutually-affecting beliefs, attitudes, or activities obtain
among a collection of individuals. Although his theory is able to account for the
heterogeneity of social groups, I maintained that his proposal is problematic insofar as he
is unable to explain non-voluntary social groups because he fails to recognize that the
causal powers of a social group are mediated by the perspectives of individuals. Dave
Elder-Vass has developed a similar conception of social grouphood and, unlike Sheehy's
theory, it is able to account for non-voluntary social groups. Elder-Vass is able to explain
non-voluntary social groups because he suggests that social groups merely condition,
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rather than cause, individual action. However, this claim calls into question the
possibility of collective agency.
The theories of social grouphood proposed by May and Elder-Vass held the most
promise of all of the accounts considered. Moreover, both raised doubts about the
possibility of collective agency. Consequently, in Chapter Four I considered whether
collective action and collective moral responsibility require collective agency. Theories
that conceive of collective action and collective moral responsibility as joint action and
joint moral responsibility, respectively, suggest that they do not. They claim that joint
action is achieved when certain relations exist among the actions of individuals.
Individualist accounts of joint action suggest that the actions of individuals must be
interrelated insofar as they are motivated by the same I-intention. On the other hand,
collectivist theories of joint action maintain that the actions of individuals must be
interrelated insofar as they are motivated by the same we-intention. Based on my
analyses of these theories, I have recommended a dialogical account of joint action that
suggests that joint action is achieved when the actions of individuals are motivated by an
intention that has emerged from dialogue with the other about what the intention entails. I
argued that this collectivist account is preferable to an individualist account because,
unlike an individualist account, it does not require sameness among the mental states of
group members. Moreover, it was my contention that these conceptions of joint
intentionality and action support an understanding of collective moral responsibility as
joint moral responsibility. Individuals are jointly morally responsible for a state of affairs
when their contributory actions are motivated by a joint intention.

This account of joint moral responsibility, and the theories of joint intentionality
and joint action upon which it is based, are compatible with the kind of non-reductionist
understanding of collective moral responsibility endorsed by Issacs. She claims that
collective moral responsibility requires a non-reductionist understanding of collective
intentionality. Although it differs from the theory of collective intentionality that Isaacs
recommends, I have proposed a non-reductionist understanding of collective
intentionality as joint intentionality. To fully explain joint intentionality one must refer to
both individuals and the relationships in which they stand. However, whereas Michael
Bratman's theory of shared intentionality suggests that the relationship that obtains
among individuals is sameness, the theory of joint intentionality that I endorse claims that
the relationships that exist among individuals are recognition and respect. Joint
intentionality requires that individuals not only endorse an intention, but also engage with
one another as they participate in its development. When the actions of individuals are
motivated and coordinated by this kind of joint intention, a state of affairs or joint action,
for which they may be held morally responsible arises.
What I am proposing is contrary to Sheehy's claim that collective moral
responsibility does not require collective intentionality. Indeed, what I am suggesting is
that a collection of individuals may be held jointly morally responsible for their joint
actions because they are motivated by joint intentionality. It is joint intentionality that
accounts for the jointness or collectivity of their individual contributory actions.
However, it is the understanding to collective intentionality as shared we-intentions to
which Sheehy objects. He questions an understanding of collective intentionality as
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shared we-intentions because he is sceptical about the possibility of members of large
collectives possessing the same intention. Since the dialogical conception of joint
intentionality that I recommend does not require this kind of sameness, perhaps he would
find it acceptable. Moreover, it seems to capture the kind of deliberation and reflection
that Sheehy identifies as necessary for collective moral responsibility. A dialogical
understanding of joint intentionality requires that individuals engage and negotiate with
one another, consider the perspectives of others, and, perhaps, reconsider their own. As
Weir suggests, this kind of dialogue can be transformative.
Thus, it appears that collective action and collective moral responsibility do not
require collective agency. Instead, collective intentionality, collective action and collective
moral responsibility need to be reconceived as joint intentionality, joint action and joint
moral responsibility, respectively. I have reached this conclusion after examining the
problematic conceptions of social grouphood upon which theories of collective
intentionality, collective action and collective moral responsibility tend to be based.
Theories of social grouphood that are able to avoid these problems raise doubts about the
possibility of collective agency. I have demonstrated that these doubts need not
undermine the possibility of collective intentionality, collective action and collective
moral responsibility. While I do not deny that the merits and shortcomings of the
conceptions of joint intentionality, joint action and joint moral responsibility that I have
recommended require further exploration, my analyses of some of the alternatives
suggest that there is reason to believe that what I am endorsing is likely to enjoy greater
success.
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